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STOPPING INTERNET-BASED
TOBACCO SALES THROUGH DOMAIN
NAME SEIZURE
Aaron J. Bursteint
INTRODUCTION
Questions about whether and how to regulate Internet-based ac-
tivities have surrounded the Internet since its entry into widespread
public use. In the United States alone, courts, legislatures, and law
enforcement agencies have confronted a wide range of legal issues,
including federal wiretap statutes, intellectual property, the First
Amendment, and the dormant commerce clause. The Internet's facili-
tation of new channels of commerce has sharpened many of these
issues. Particularly difficult legal and policy questions have arisen in
the context of commercial activities that largely thwart or circumvent
existing regulatory institutions; gambling,' pornography, 2 and copy-
right infringement3 are a few examples. A common theme among
these disparate doctrinal areas is that the Internet supports the percep-
t Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Washing-
ton, DC. Support for this research was provided by the Robert Wood Johnson Foun-
dation to the School of Public Health at the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill (Principal Investigator, Kurt M. Ribisl, Ph.D.). UNC-CH provided a subcontract
to the Technical Assistance Legal Center at the Public Health Institute that supported
the author's efforts. The author further acknowledges helpful comments from Marice
Ashe, Samantha Graff, Stephen Bundy, Daniel Farber, and Peter Menell. The views
expressed in this article are the author's own and are not purported to reflect those of
any other person or the United States Department of Justice.
See, e.g., Gale Courey Toensing, Foxwoods' "PlayAway" Ruled Illegal,
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Aug. 23, 2005, available at http://www.indiancountry.com/
content.cfm?id=1096411437 (reporting that Connecticut gambling regulators ruled
that the purchase and use of keno tickets over the Internet violated state law and a
compact between the state and the Mashuntucket Pequot Tribal Nation).
2 See, e.g., United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003)
(upholding statute that requires recipients of federal subsidies for Internet access to
install pornography filters).
3 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct.
2764 (2005) (holding that peer-to-peer software makers may be held liable for con-
tributory copyright infringement).
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tion that parties to a transaction are anonymous, leading some to offer,
and others to seek, goods that they ordinarily would avoid.
Tobacco holds a prominent place on the list of goods that the
Internet has made easier to obtain either illegally or in a manner that is
most compelling as a commercial proposition when both parties re-
gard the applicable law with a wink and nod. Economically speaking,
the Internet presents an arbitrage opportunity. Because a considerable
fraction of the price of a pack of cigarettes consists of a state excise
tax, a dealer who buys cigarettes in a low-tax jurisdiction can earn a
profit simply by reselling to consumers in a high-tax jurisdiction-if
the dealer either ignores his duty to pay the difference in tax or turns a
blind eye to the probability that the buyer will not pay it. States with
high excise taxes suffer in at least two ways. First, a high-tax state
loses tax revenue each time a buyer in that state buys a carton of ciga-
rettes from an Internet cigarette vendor (ICV) rather than from an in-
state retailer. But, more importantly, the gray market resulting from
Internet-based tobacco sales facilitates young buyers' cigarette pur-
chases. Underage smokers might be able to order cigarettes them-
selves via the Internet, though many ICV sites claim that they will not
ship to underage consumers.4 Alternatively, buyers who meet the age
requirements in high-tax states can buy large quantities of cigarettes
and then sell them in-person to underage buyers. This system both
reduces the risk that consumers will be refused cigarettes because they
are underage and allows them to buy cigarettes at below-market
prices. The likelihood that younger buyers are more sensitive to price
than older buyers means that Internet-based tobacco sales pose a spe-
cial risk to underage smokers. The likely public health consequences
are clear: People will start smoking more and earlier. The already se-
rious public health problem of underage smoking could, therefore, be
made worse by ICVs. As with many other harms facilitated by Inter-
net transactions, the dealer who is highest on the chain of distribu-
tion-the ICV-presents the most inviting target for enforcement.
The current programs of some local, state, and federal government
agencies show some promise for disrupting or shutting down ICVs.
The City of New York, for example, recently sought $1.3 million in
unpaid tobacco taxes from some 3,700 residents. At the federal level,
the FBI has the primary authority to investigate alleged violations of
4 See, e.g., eSmokes.com, Legal Information, http://www.esmokes.com
(follow "Legal Info" hyperlink) (last visited May 8, 2006) (stating that eSmokes.com
will not sell tobacco products to buyers under the age of twenty-one).
5 N.Y Asks Online Cigarette Buyers to Cough Up Tax, CNET NEWS.COM,
Jan. 14, 2005, http://news.com.com/2100-1030_3-5537213.html.
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the federal law that provides the most effective weapon against ICVs. 6
Since the FBI's priorities have understandably shifted toward counter-
terrorism efforts, few federal resources are available to use against
ICVs. 7 The relatively light penalties that federal law provides for
evading state tobacco taxes further reduce the likelihood of federal
involvement.8 The clashing regulatory priorities that states hold for
tobacco regulation-some states produce tobacco, while others have
active anti-tobacco agendas-also make federal enforcement difficult
to coordinate. Despite questions about its jurisdiction to enforce the
Jenkins Act, the U.S. Department of Justice's Bureau of Alcohol, To-
bacco, Firearms and Explosives, and a coalition of states persuaded
major credit card companies and online payment sites to stop accept-
ing payments for online tobacco purchases. 9 This action reportedly led
to the rapid end of some ICVs, but ICVs apparently also are making
payment arrangements that use credit cards issued by foreign banks.'
Other private actors have lent support to the effort. UPS, for example,
announced that it would stop delivering cigarettes bought online. I I
These developments should encourage those who would like to con-
trol the sale of tobacco online, but the willingness of vendors to evade
the law and their resourcefulness in finding alternative logistical ar-
rangements to support their sales suggest a need for more robust
means of stopping ICV-based tobacco sales.
Individual states have strong public health incentives as well as
the legal authority to develop these means. State-based enforcement
could also take a variety of forms, ranging from the collection of un-
paid taxes, to injunctive relief, to seizing the machinery that ICVs use
to conduct business. In this Article, I argue that states may "shut
down" ICVs by seizing their Web addresses, or domain names. Do-
main name divestiture would take advantage of the ICV's renown and
provide the state with a forum for a message of its choice. In this re-
spect, ICV domain name seizure would go beyond seizure in order to
satisfy creditors, 12 who presumably would seek to sell rights to the
6 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-743, INTERNET CIGARETTE
SALES: GIVING ATF INVESTIGATIVE AuTHORRTY MAY IMPROVE REPORTING AND
ENFORCEMENT 2, 7-8 (2002) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
7 See id. at 4.
8 See id.
9 Bob Tedeschi, Trouble for Online Vendors of Cigarettes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
4, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/O4/O4/technology/O4ecom.html?
ex=1270267200&en=bbdd0fc 1 ef524632&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland.
10 Id.
11 No UPS for Smokes Bought Online, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 3, 2005, at
9JH.
12 For a thorough analysis of domain name seizure as a form of debt collec-
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name. In addition, I argue that this kind of top-level enforcement is
more likely to be effective in combating the most pressing problem-
underage smoking-than the other potential strategies.
Part I of this Article describes the relevant federal and state to-
bacco regulations that a state attorney general would have to consider
when undertaking ICV domain name seizure. Part II analyzes the le-
gal challenges that might arise from these tobacco- and technology-
specific regulations. Part III provides a technical and institutional
background that a plaintiff suing an online tobacco retailer should
consider when to deciding whom to sue, where to bring a lawsuit, and
how to structure proposed relief. Part IV considers, and rejects, de-
fenses based upon trademark law that an ICV might raise against do-
main name seizure. Finally, Part V argues that the First Amendment
does not present a defense against domain name seizure.
I. THE REGULATORY AND TECHNOLOGICAL
BACKGROUND OF INTERNET-BASED TOBACCO
SALES
The primary federal law regulating ICVs is the Jenkins Act,
13
which requires that a party that sells tobacco to an out-of-state buyer
must report the buyer's name and address,14 along with the number of
cigarettes purchased, 15 to the entity responsible for collecting tobacco
taxes in the buyer's state.' 6 In a lawsuit brought by a state attorney
general under the Jenkins Act, the state would allege that the ICV's
sales of cigarettes to the state's residents violate the Jenkins Act's
reporting requirement. A nearly certain consequence of this failure, as
a casual survey of ICVs' websites will confirm, is that cigarette pur-
chases made over the Internet deprive states of tax revenue. 17 The
primary purpose of the proposed lawsuit is not to collect this tax reve-
tion, see generally Juliet M. Moringiello, Seizing Domain Names to Enforce Judg-
ments: Looking Back to Look to the Future, 72 U. CIN. L. REv. 95 (2003).
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 375-78 (2000).
14 § 376(a)(2).
's § 376(a)(2).
16 § 376(a)(2).
17 See, e.g., eSmokes.com, supra note 4 (eSmokes declares that all of its
sales are made in "the state of North Carolina and/or Kentucky" and that "[i]n order
to determine the applicable limits on purchases or taxing responsibilities, if any, im-
posed by your particular state, the consumer may want to contact their state authori-
ties"). A GAO Report confirmed that few ICVs comply with the Jenkins Act. In a
survey of ICVs conducted between December 2001 and May 2002, the GAO reported
that only 5 percent (eight out of 147 sites examined) posted any notice that the Jen-
kins Act required the ICV to report each interstate sale and that this could create tax
liability for the buyer. GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 16-20.
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nue-though the state could do so-but to strip the ICV of its domain
name. In addition, individual states have tobacco-related laws, primar-
ily differing in their excise tax rates.' 8
Given this statutory landscape, a state attorney general would
have the choice of suing an ICV in state court. For convenience, how-
ever, I analyze the issue of a federal court's jurisdiction to hear the
lawsuit. I have made this choice for two reasons. First, the federal
courts' requirements governing subject matter are stricter than those
of many state courts. Second, although states' personal jurisdiction
requirements vary considerably, several states-notably, California-
have adopted the federal courts' test for finding personal jurisdiction.
An analysis of a lawsuit against an ICV in federal court will therefore
examine the most stringent subject matter jurisdiction requirements
while achieving a certain amount of generality for personal jurisdic-
tion; the analysis is not meant to suggest that a state attorney general
must or should bring such a suit in federal court.
II. THE POWER OF FEDERAL COURTS TO HEAR
SUITS AGAINST ICVS
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Article III of the United States Constitution limits the kinds of
suits-the subject matter-that federal courts may hear.19 Subject
matter jurisdiction is fundamental to a court's power to settle a
dispute; parties may not consent to suit, and the court must dismiss a
suit when subject matter jurisdiction is found to be lacking.20 Since
the proposed lawsuits involve federal law as their substantive basis,
the state plaintiffs will satisfy the requirements of "arising under"
jurisdiction.21
Slightly more complicated questions arise in connection with
whether a federal district court would have subject matter jurisdiction
to hear claims based upon state law. This situation might arise, for
example, if the state wished to sue the ICV for recovery of unpaid
18 See GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 5 (reporting each state's excise tax on
cigarettesg)
c.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
20 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) ("Whenever it appears by suggestion of
the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court
shall dismiss the action.").
21 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) (granting federal district courts original jurisdic-
tion over "civil actions arising under the.., laws.., of the United States").
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cigarette taxes. In such a case, the district court might have diversity
jurisdiction over the suit.22
The state will be able to bring this claim so long as two conditions
hold: (1) the state seeks to recover more than $75,000;23 and (2) the
ICV is a citizen of a different state24 or the citizen of a foreign state.25
The diversity of citizenship prong is likely to be met; the underlying
economic premise of ICVs is that they pay the low tobacco tax of the
state in which the ICV resides, so the attorney general of the ICV's
state of citizenship2 6 is unlikely to have a claim against the ICV for
failure to pay state tax. Satisfying the amount in controversy require-
ment could prove more difficult, but a rough calculation of lost tax
revenue indicates that a state could probably find an ICV that owes
more than $75,000 in state tax. The U.S. General Accounting Office
(GAO) estimates that California lost $13 million in tax revenue from
Jenkins Act noncompliance in the period of May 1999 to September
2001.27 If this loss is assumed to be attributable in equal parts to the
147 web sites that the GAO studied,28 then the tax lost per ICV is
about $85,435. It is impossible to predict an outcome, however, with-
out facts pertaining to a specific ICV.
Relying on the diversity jurisdiction of the district court will
probably be unnecessary, however, because district courts have sup-
plemental jurisdiction over state law claims that are "so related" to a
claim arising under federal law "that they form part of the same case
or controversy ....',29 This close relationship of the federal claim
(failure to report interstate cigarette sales) and the state claim (failure
to pay state tobacco tax) is probably present in suits against ICVs. A
district court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law
claims without requiring that they satisfy any minimum amount in
controversy.3° If, however, the federal claim is dropped or dismissed,
22 See generally 28 U.S.C.S. § 1332 (LexisNexis 2003) (granting federal
district courts original jurisdiction over diversity suits). This statute implements one
of the jurisdictional heads of Article III of the U.S. Constitution: "The judicial power
shall extend.., to controversies... between citizens of different states." U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
23 § 1332(a).
24 § 1332(a)(1).
25 § 1332(a)(2).
26 See § 1332(c)(1) (stating that "a corporation shall be deemed to be a citi-
zen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its
principal place of business . .
2 GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 15 & n. 16.
28 Id. at 23-26 (describing details and method of study).
29 28 U.S.C.S. § 1367(a) (LexisNexis 2003).
30 See § 1367(b) (making clear that supplemental jurisdiction is generally
available when the plaintiff presents a claim arising under federal law, and thus within
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and there is no other basis for subject matter jurisdiction (diversity
jurisdiction, for example), the federal court will lack jurisdiction over
the related state law claims and must dismiss them. Finally, a state
that seeks to litigate the merits of a state tax claim in another state's
court will likely be barred from bringing such a claim, unless the fo-
rum state explicitly allows it.31 Though this consideration is part of the
merits of a lawsuit, rather than jurisdiction, it is worth noting here as a
consideration that the state should make in order to obtain full relief.
32
B. Standing
Some have expressed doubt that a state has standing to enforce the
Jenkins Act 33 because its only explicit remedy is criminal. 34 A court
has recently held, however, that the Act contains an implicit right to
injunctive relief, which states may seek. 35 The remainder of this Arti-
cle assumes that this holding is correct on both points: states may en-
force the Jenkins Act through civil actions, but only for injunctive
relief.
C. Personal Jurisdiction
A state attorney general who seeks to seize an ICV's domain
name would have to decide whether to file suit against the ICV it-
self-and thus need to establish in personam jurisdiction over the
ICV-or whether to file an in rem suit that names the ICV's domain
name as a defendant. Exercises of personal and in rem jurisdiction are
the jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1331).
31 See Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 272 (1935)
(noting that a state may authorize its courts to hear claims for taxes owed to another
state); id. at 275 (stating that the obligation of a state to enforce the tax laws of an-
other state is "an open question").
32 Id. at 272 (noting that whether "the courts in one state will... entertain a
suit to recover taxes due to another ... goes not to the jurisdiction but to the merits,"
namely, whether the state has opened its courts to out-of-state tax claims).
33 See generally Wash., Dep't of Revenue v. www.dirtcheapcig.com, Inc.,
260 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (rejecting ICV's contention that the state
attorney general does not have standing to sue under the Jenkins Act).
3 See 15 U.S.C.S. § 377 (LexisNexis 2000) ("Whoever violates any provi-
sion of this chapter shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined not more than
$1,000, or imprisoned not more than 6 months, or both.").
35 See www.dirtcheapcig.com, 260 F. Supp. 2d at 1054-55 (holding that the
grant of jurisdiction to federal "district courts 'to prevent and restrain violations of the
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 378"', and legislative history indicating that Congress intended the
Act to help states collect tobacco taxes, imply a cause of action); id (applying the
four-part test for implied causes of action, announced in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78
(1975)).
2006]
HEALTH M TRIX
subject to the same limitation-both must be consistent with due
process.36 Legislatures and courts have maintained these conceptual
divisions and apply them to Internet-based activities,3 7 and personal
and in rem jurisdiction raise quite different questions in practice. Most
importantly, the scope of relief available against ICVs is considerably
broader when personal jurisdiction is available.38
The fundamental limitation on a court's territorial jurisdiction-
whether personal or in rem-is the Due Process Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.39 In International Shoe Co. v. Washington,4 ° the Su-
preme Court held that due process requires that a defendant have "cer-
tain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the mainte-
nance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."' 41 Physical presence within a state's boundaries is
sufficient but not necessary, constitutionally speaking, for the exercise
of personal jurisdiction.42 Similarly, when the Supreme Court an-
36 See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977) (characterizing precedent
as elaborating Due Process requirements of personal jurisdiction).
37 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.S. § 1125(d)(1)(A) (LexisNexis 2005) (providing civil
cause of action against "[a] person" who, in bad faith, registers a domain name that
infringes a right of a trademark holder); § 1125(d)(2)(A) (providing in rem civil cause
of action against domain name, when in personam jurisdiction over registrant is un-
available); Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506, 508 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(finding general jurisdiction over online brokerage in breach of contract action);
Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003) (comparing domain names to
other forms of property and noting that Congress had explicitly made trademark-
infringing domain names subject to in rem actions).
31 See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 199 & n.17 ("The effect of a judgment in such a
case [in rem] is limited to the property that supports jurisdiction and does not impose
a personal liability on the property owner, since he is not before the court.").
39 See id. at 207 (characterizing precedent as elaborating Due Process re-
quirements of personal jurisdiction).
40 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The ultimate limit of a state court's personal jurisdic-
tion comes from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law."). Federal courts are limited by the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall .. .be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... ). For the pur-
poses of territorial jurisdiction, the requirements of both clauses are identical; a de-
fendant without minimum contacts in the forum state cannot be sued in a court sitting
in that state. See Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 224
(4th Cir. 2002) (applying Int 7 Shoe Co. to federal courts through the Fifth Amend-
ment).
41 Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,
463 (1940)).
42 Id. at 316-17 ("[T]he terms 'present' or 'presence' are used merely to
symbolize those activities of the corporation's agent within the state which courts will
deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process.").
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nounced that the "minimum contacts" formulation of jurisdiction ex-
tended to in rem actions,43 it made clear that the location of property
in a state does not necessarily create jurisdiction over it, though it
does "bear on the existence of jurisdiction.""
After a period of considerable uncertainty about the law of per-
sonal jurisdiction for Internet-based activities, this area is becoming
fairly predictable. The analysis presented here assumes that the court
would apply either the Due Process Clause or a state "long-arm stat-
ute" that authorizes courts of the relevant state to exercise jurisdiction
to the full extent allowed by due process. 45 In addition, I restrict my
attention to an exercise of specific jurisdiction-that is, a suit against
a non-resident defendant for a cause of action arising from the defen-
dant's activities in the forum.46
A federal district court will most likely have to exercise specific
personal jurisdiction over an ICV defendant. Most circuits have
adopted a three-prong test that frames the minimum contacts standard
of International Shoe for the specific jurisdiction context. In the Ninth
Circuit, for example, the nonresident defendant must purposely avail
himself of the laws of the forum state, the claim must arise from the
defendant's activities in that state, and the court must find it reason-
able to exercise jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant.47
1. Purposeful Availment
Courts have taken three approaches to assessing whether Internet
contacts constitute purposeful availment of the laws of the forum
41 Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 207 ("The standard for determining whether an exer-
cise of jurisdiction over the interests of persons is consistent with the Due Process
Clause is the minimum-contacts standard elucidated in International Shoe."). Shaffer
also notes that in rem jurisdiction "'is a customary elliptical way of referring to juris-
diction over the interests of persons in a thing."' Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 56 (Introductory Note 1971)).
44 Id. at 207.
41 California, for example, authorizes its state courts to exercise jurisdiction
"on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United
States." CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 2004). Not all states, however, permit
such expansive exercises ofjurisdiction.
v See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414
nn.8-9 (1984) (approving of "specific" and "general" categories of personal jurisdic-
tion). The Ninth Circuit briefly held a catalog- and Internet-based company subject to
general jurisdiction, but this exceptional ruling was later vacated. See Gator.com
Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated, 398 F.3d 1125
(9th Cir. 2005).
47 Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998)
(quoting Omeluk v. Langsten Slip & Batbyggeri A/S, 52 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir.
1995)).
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state. The first approach is simply to decide whether a particular de-
fendant has purposefully availed himself of the laws of the forum
state.48 The Ninth Circuit's gloss on purposeful availment requires
that a defendant "has taken deliberate action within the forum state or
if he has created continuing obligations to forum residents. ' 49 Alterna-
tively, when a defendant has "performed some type of affirmative
conduct which allows or promotes the transaction of business within
the forum state,"50 exercise of jurisdiction is proper.
Examples of continuing obligations include selling insurance or
extending loans to the residents of a forum state.5' If an ICV conducts
only discrete commercial transactions, it seems unlikely to be found to
have continuing obligations. Shipping cigarettes to a forum state's
residents does not create an ongoing relationship with any particular
person in the state, the way that insurance or a loan does.52 However,
an ICV that ships cigarettes to a forum state would probably be seen
to have "taken deliberate action" in that state. The Ninth Circuit has
found this standard satisfied by as little as the out-of-state publication
of comments that a state resident alleged to be defamatory.53 Although
an allegedly defamatory publication is not directly analogous to con-
ducting commerce over the Internet, the fact that this kind of passive
activity was held to be "deliberate action" in the forum state suggests
that sending cigarettes to residents of a forum state-a more individu-
alized interaction, where it is necessary to learn the location of the
website visitor and recipient-is also deliberate action. An ICV is
likely to be found to purposefully avail itself of a forum state's laws
under this "traditional" approach.
The second approach to purposeful availment "comes clos[e] to a
special doctrine of personal jurisdiction for the Internet., 54 This ap-
proach, which was first articulated in Zippo Manufacturing Co. v.
Zippo Dot Corn, Inc.,5 evaluates purposeful availment according to a
48 See Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D.
Conn. 1996) (holding that a company whose website and toll-free number were avail-
able to residents of a state had "purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing
business within" that state).
49 Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995).
50 Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1362 (9th Cir. 1990).
51 Id. (discussing such examples).
52 See Ballard, 65 F.3d at 1499 (noting that insurance entails a "continuing
obligation" to a state resident).
53 Nw. Healthcare Alliance Inc. v. Healthgrades.com, Inc., 50 Fed. Appx.
339, 341 (9th Cir. 2002).
54 Note, No Bad Puns: A Different Approach to the Problem of Personal
Jurisdiction and the Internet, 116 HARv. L. REV. 1821, 1831 (2003).
55 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
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single "sliding scale" that makes the interactivity and business capa-
bilities of a website.56 At one end of the scale are highly interactive,
clearly commercial websites, which support jurisdiction. 7 At the
other end are passive websites, which do not create jurisdiction.5
Websites with some interactive, commercial features might support
jurisdiction under Zippo.59 This uncertainty is leading some courts
away from the Zippo approach.60
ICV websites fit squarely within the kinds of sites that lead courts
applying Zippo to find specific jurisdiction. The conduct of commer-
cial activity on a website is at the jurisdiction-affirmative end of
Zippo's scale. ICV websites allow users to browse the ICV's inven-
61tory and place orders for cigarettes. ICVs engage in "'something
more' than 'mere advertisement or solicitation;' '62 they run sophisti-
cated electronic commerce operations that allow residents of a differ-
ent state to shop for and purchase cigarettes from the ICV.
A plaintiff should not, however, rely solely upon Zippo as the
standard for specific personal jurisdiction. The sense that Zippo incor-
porates a certain conception of technology, and the accompanying
unsteady evolution of the test, have led some courts to look to a third
approach to purposeful availment on the Internet. 63 Courts are increas-
ingly turning, or returning, to a purposeful availment inquiry, albeit
with a more realistic approach to activity on the Internet than was
56 Some courts seem to collapse the entire minimum contacts analysis into
the Zippo test. See, e.g., Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1999)
(discussing minimum contacts solely in terms of Zippo).
5 Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
58 Id.
59 See Michael A. Geist, Is There a There There? Toward Greater Certainty
for Internet Jurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1345, 1376-80 (2001) (arguing that
most websites fall into Zippo's middle category, that the standards for activity and
passivity change, and that the commercial activity focus results in overbroad and
underinclusive assertions of jurisdictions).
60 See Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L.
REv. 311, 415-18 (2002) (criticizing Zippo approach as "unstable and difficult to
apply," and citing cases that take different approaches). But see Gator.com Corp. v.
L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2003) (extending Zippo approach to
general jurisdiction), vacated, 398 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2005).
61 See, eg., Cigarettes at Discount Prices-Cheap Cigarettes, http://www.
esmokes.com (last visited Feb. 17, 2006) (select "Camel" from "Premium Cigarettes"
drop down menu) (listing prices for cartons of Camel cigarettes and providing facili-
ties for ordering cigarettes).
62 Gator.com Corp., 341 F.3d at 1080 (quoting Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell,
Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1997)).
63 See Berman, supra note 60, at 412-20 (collecting cases that avoid the
Zippo test); Geist, supra note 59, at 1360-80 (also collecting cases that avoid the
Zippo test).
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displayed in the reasoning of early cases. 64 This post-Zippo approach
derives from the "effects test" of Calder v. Jones.65 Under Calder,
jurisdiction is proper when "(1) intentional act[ions] . . . (2) expressly
aimed at the forum state ... (3) caus[e] harm, the brunt of which is
suffered[,] and which the defendant knows is likely to be suffered[,] in
the forum state. 66
The Ninth Circuit has interpreted the "express aiming" element as
a requirement that the defendant engage in an "individualized target-
ing" of a forum state's known residents. 67 For example, in Calder
itself, the Court held that a Florida resident's selection of a California
resident as the subject of an allegedly defamatory news story was
"expressly aimed" at California.68 Other examples of express aiming
include fraudulently sending a letter on behalf of a forum resident69
and sending a letter to a forum resident to demand that the resident
stop using a domain name. 70 By contrast, "express aiming" is absent
when a defendant's "essentially passive" website contains material
that allegedly infringes the rights of a trademark holder, of whom the
defendant is unaware.7'
A general objection that an ICV could raise to the exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction is that it does not avail itself of the forum state's
laws at all. Indeed, the ICV might argue, as defendant ICV did in
Washington Department of Revenue v. www.dirtcheapcig.com, Inc.
(Dirtcheap),72 that the ICV takes care to establish by contract that all
of its sales are conducted in the ICV's home state, and the buyer as-
sumes responsibility for paying any applicable tax in his or her home
64 For an example of a somewhat wooden application of the purposeful
availment framework, see Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161,
165 (D. Conn. 1996).
65 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
66 Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th
Cur. 200 0d
P Id
. 
at 1088.
68 Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90 (noting, in addition, clear satisfaction of inten-
tional action and knowledge that the story would have a "potentially devastating"
impact on the plaintiff).
69 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Neaves, 912 F.2d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 1990) (find-
ing "purgosefu[l] defrauding" of forum resident critical to exercise of jurisdiction).
Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1084-85, 1088.
71 Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 420 (9th Cir. 1997) (af-
firming dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction over such a defendant). See Ban-
croft, 223 F.3d at 1088 (characterizing Cybersell's result as consistent with the Calder
effects test).
72 260 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1052 (W.D. Wash. 2003).
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state. Dirtcheap's website, like many other ICV websites, purports to
establish these two conditions.73
Whatever merit the general enforceability of "clickwrap" con-
tracts may lend to a glance at Dirtcheap's argument, there is an essen-
tial difference between the role it asserts for such a contract and those
that have been enforced by courts. Courts have been willing to enforce
online contracts that pertain to acceptable subject matter for contract-
ing, such as the rights and duties of parties to a commercial transac-
tion.74 The fact that a court will enforce an ordinary commercial con-
tract that happens to be formed over the Internet, however, does not
suggest that rules pertaining to the substance of contract no longer
exist. In particular, the Internet does not confer an ability to rewrite
public law. The Dirtcheap court noted this limitation on contract en-
forceability in rejecting Dirtcheap's argument.7 5 Thus, while a defen-
dant might be able to argue in some circumstances that he or she has
agreed not to be subject to the laws of a specific state, those circum-
stances do not include agreements to alter compliance with federal
and state tax law. To summarize, a state plaintiff can most likely show
that an ICV that sells cigarettes to the state's residents purposefully
avails itself of the state's laws.
2. Claims Arising from Forum Contacts
A state plaintiff suing an ICV must establish that its claim against
the ICV arises from the ICV's contacts with the state. In the Ninth
Circuit, this means that the plaintiff must establish that it would not
have suffered injury but for the ICV's contacts that constitute pur-
poseful availment.76 Often this requirement is deemed satisfied with
little analysis.77 Such was the case in Panavision International, L.P. v.
Toeppen.78 Plaintiff Panavision alleged that defendant Toeppen had
73 Dirtcheapcig.com: The Last Refuge of the Persecuted Smoker,
http://www.dirtcheapcigs.com/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2006) (declaring that all sales
occur in Kentucky, and that the buyer may be responsible for paying state tax); To-
bacco4less.com: Your Online Discount Tobacco Store, http://www.tobacco4less.com/
(last visited Feb. 25, 2004) (declaring that all sales occur in Virginia, and that the
buyer may, be responsible for paying state tax).
"Clickwrap" contracts are generally enforceable, so long as the offeree-
buyer has an opportunity to review the contract's terms before the sale is complete,
and some manifestation of the buyer's assent is recorded. See Hill v. Gateway 2000,
Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148-49 (7th Cir. 1997) (enforcing arbitration clause in a form
contract, which the plaintiff had never read, accompanying a new computer).
75 www.dirtcheapcig.com, 260 F. Supp. 2d at 1051-53.
76 Doe v. UNOCAL Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 925 (9th Cir. 2001).
77 See, e.g., Ziegler v. Indian River County, 64 F.3d 470, 474 (9th Cir. 1995).
78 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
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registered some of plaintiffs trademarks as domain names.7 9 The
Ninth Circuit concluded that Panavision would not have suffered this
80injury if Toeppen had not registered these domain names.
Callaway Golf Corp. v. Royal Canadian Golf Ass 'n81 furnishes an
example of where a plaintiff failed to show a sufficient relationship
between its alleged injury and the defendant's forum related activities.
In Callaway, defendant golf association banned golf clubs that pos-
sessed a "spring-like" effect from its tournaments.82 In its announce-
ment of this rule, the defendant named several of the plaintiffs
clubs.83 Plaintiff filed suit in California for, among other things, trade
libel, and sought to establish jurisdiction based upon the defendant's
website, which was accessible to California residents.84 The court not
only expressed doubt that the website constituted purposeful avail-
ment, but, finding the website unrelated to any of plaintiffs claims, it
also held that "it cannot be said that 'but-for' defendant's commercial
activity on its Web site, plaintiff would not have suffered the injuries
defendant allegedly caused.,
85
A state suing an ICV is unlikely to have difficulty establishing a
but-for connection between its Jenkins Act claim and the ICV's con-
tacts in the state. The Jenkins Act injury that the state would allege
consists of the ICV's failure to report cigarette sales to the state's tax
authority.86 As the Dirtcheap court noted, it is the ICV's duty to file
Jenkins Act reports for sales made to state residents.87 Since this fail-
ure to report is also the state's injury, the arising-from prong is met.8
If the state brings broader claims-state tax or unfair competition
claims, for example-this prong could still probably be satisfied. The
ICV defendant's website and shipment of cigarettes to forum residents
provide the underlying conduct for the unfair competition claim.
Thus, the ICV has little room to argue that the state's unfair competi-
tion does not arise from activities in the forum. Meeting this require-
ment as to state tax claims could be more difficult. The outcome of the
tax claim will depend on the details of state law, specifically whether
a vendor or a buyer is obligated to pay tax for cigarettes shipped into
79 Id. at 1318.
" Id. at 1322.
81 125 F. Supp. 2d 1194 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
82 Id. at 1198-99.
83 Id. at 1198.
84 Id. at 1197.
8 Id. at 1204.86 15 U.S.C. § 376(a) (2000); Wash., Dep't of Revenue v. www.dirtcheapcig.
corn, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1052-53 (W.D. Wash. 2003).
87 www.dirtcheapcig.com, 260 F. Supp. 2d at 1053.
88 See id.
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the forum state. If state law requires the vendor to pay this tax, then
the Jenkins Act analysis, set forth above, applies. If, on the other
hand, state law requires the buyer to pay the tax, then the ICV would
have a fair argument that the but-for cause of the state's injury lies
with the state's residents. The state could argue against this strict
sense of causation on the grounds that, but for the ICV's activities in
the forum state, residents would not have the opportunity to buy to-
bacco without paying state tax.89 Also, the predicted objection dis-
cussed here goes more to a question of merit, namely, the question of
who is obligated to pay state tax, than it goes to jurisdiction. More-
over, this prong only requires that the state's claims be related to the
ICV's forum-related activities, not those that take place in the forum
state itself. These activities include the forum state's residents doing
business with the ICV.90
3. Reasonableness
Finally, a court must decide whether its exercise of jurisdiction
would be reasonable and "does not offend 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice."' 9' Most courts use standards that require
the balancing of several factors to determine reasonableness, 92 and in
practice this often turns application of the standard into a fact-specific
exercise involving little appeal to precedent.93 Other courts simply
89 The Dirtcheap court offered little more than a conclusory statement: "But
for Dirtcheap's alleged cigarette sales to Washington consumers, the State would not
have suffered this injury." Id. at 1052-53.
90 See RIO Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1021 (9th Cir.
2002) (holding that a Costa Rican firm that operated a gambling website could be
sued by a Nevada resort for trademark infringement, because the resort's injury oc-
curred in Nevada).
91 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
92 Courts in the Ninth Circuit, for example, consider seven factors in their
reasonable inquiry:
(1) the extent of a defendant's purposeful interjection; (2) the burden on the
defendant in defending in the forum; (3) the extent of conflict with the sov-
ereignty of the defendant's state; (4) the forum state's interest in adjudicat-
ing the dispute; (5) the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy;
(6) the importance of the forum to the plaintiffs interest in convenient and
effective relief; and (7) the existence of an alternative forum.
RIO Props., 284 F.3d at 1021 (citing Core Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus. AB, 11 F.3d
1482, 1488 (9th Cir. 1993)). Other circuits use similar collections of factors. See
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 577-78 (2d Cir.
1996) (Walker, J., dissenting) (surveying unreasonableness tests in a number of
circuits).
93 See, e.g., RIO Props., 284 F.3d at 1021 (briefly reviewing each factor).
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note that the defendant did not raise the issue of unreasonableness.94
Jurisdiction is presumed reasonable 95 unless the defendant presents a
"compelling case" against reasonableness.96 While the state attorney
general seeking domain name seizure would have good arguments for
each factor considered in the reasonableness inquiry, he or she might
wish to emphasize that the state has a strong interest in adjudicating
the dispute in order to minimize the loss of tax revenue and protect the
health of its citizens.
D. Jurisdiction over Things (In Rem Jurisdiction)
As explained in the next Part, domain name's situs is probably in
the judicial district of the domain name registry; for .com domain
names, this is the Eastern District of Virginia.97 However, any relief
obtained against a domain name is not effective against an ICV; the
ICV can choose a different domain name, or simply choose a foreign
top-level domain (TLD).98 For these reasons, the state probably will
not be able to accomplish its goals by bringing a suit in rem against an
ICV.
III. THE DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM
This section provides technical and institutional background that a
plaintiff suing an online tobacco retailer should consider when decid-
ing whom to sue, where to bring a lawsuit, and how to structure pro-
posed relief.
A. General Background
The Domain Name System (DNS) translates alphanumeric
domain names, such as "affordablecigs.com," into the numerical
addresses that computers connected to the Internet actually use to
94 Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1323 (9th Cir. 1998).
95 Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 89 F. Supp. 2d 1154,
1160 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
96 Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 2003),
vacated, 366 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2004).
97 VeriSign, Inc., COM NET Registry for Domain Registrars,
http://www.verisign.com/information-services/naming-services/com-net-registry/inde
x.html (last visited May 8, 2006) (stating that "VeriSign's COM NET Registry is the
authoritative registry for .com and .net domain names"); GlobalSantaFe Corp. v.
GlobalSantaFe.com, 250 F. Supp. 2d 610, 614-15 (E.D. Va. 2003) (stating that
VeriSign's .com registry is located in the Eastern District of Virginia).
98 See supra Part III.B for a discussion of Yesmoke's election to use a Swiss
TLD.
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communicate with each other. 99 Two components of a domain name
are of interest here because of their jurisdictional consequences. One
component is the TLD---".com" in the case of affordablecigs.com
00
Each TLD is administered by a single registry.'0' The company
VeriSign, for example, is the registry for the .com TLD.10 2 The second
component of interest is the second-level domain name-e.g.,
affordablecigs.'13 Domain name registrars process domain name
registrations.'°4 For example, a person wishing to register
"affordablecigs.com" would visit a registrar (or, more often, a
registrar's website) to check whether the domain name has been
registered. If no one has registered the name, the registrar will pair
"affordablecigs.com" with a numerical Internet Protocol (IP) address
and then send this pair to the .com registry. 10 5 The registry will then
enter the domain name-IP address pair into its top-level "zone file."'
0 6
Finally, once the updated zone file propagates throughout the DNS,
Internet users worldwide will have access to the computer at
"affordablecigs.com."
At the end of a successful registration, the domain name registrant
will have conducted business directly with a registrar and indirectly
with a registry. There is general agreement that any domain name
registered with a U.S.-based registry is subject to an in rem action
under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act'0 7 in the judi-
cial district of the registry, regardless of whether the domain name
registrant resides in the United States or elsewhere. 108 Actions brought
99 See Internet Corp. for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), FAQs,
http://www.icann.org/faq/#dns (last visited May 16, 2006) (answering the question,
"What is the Domain Name System?").
'00 GlobalSantaFe, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 618-19.
'o' See ICANN, Registry Listing, http://www.icann.org/registries/listing.html
(last visited May 16, 2006).
102 ICANN, .com Registry Agreement (May 25, 2001), http://www.icann.org/
tlds/agreements/verisign/registry-agmt-com-25may01 .htm.
103 GlobalSantaFe, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 619.
104 See ICANN, FAQs, supra note 99 (answering the question, "How do I
register a domain name?" with "Domain names can be registered through many dif-
ferent companies (known as 'registrars') that compete with one another.").
105 GlobalSantaFe, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 619 ("Registering, transferring, or
deleting a domain name typically involves interaction between the registrar and the
registry.").
'6 GlobalSantaFe, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 618-19.
107 Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-545 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
1125(d) (2003)).
108 See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc. v. AOL.org, 259 F. Supp. 2d 449, 451 (E.D.
Va. 2003) (ordering U.S.-based registry to transfer domain name registered by a resi-
dent of South Korea who exhibited "no evidence that he has any contacts with the
United States or Virginia").
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against the domain name registrants themselves are subject to more
stringent showings of contacts between the registrant and the district
where the suit is filed.' 09 Still, the federal courts have displayed con-
siderable willingness to enter default judgments against foreign de-
fendants who have no contact with the United States, aside from a
website." 0
B. Domain Names: Property Interests and Situs
Domain name registrants are generally considered to have prop-
erty rights in their domain names,11' though this property right may
include little more than the right to exclude others from using the
same domain name.' 12 The Ninth Circuit, in Kremen v. Cohen, 13 gave
a thorough argument for viewing domain names as property. In gen-
eral, a property interest exists when (1) there is "'an interest capable
of precise definition;"' (2) the interest is "'capable of exclusive pos-
session or control;"' and (3) the "'putative owner [has] established a
legitimate claim to exclusivity.""'14 The Kremen court found domain
names to be well-defined interests because they perform a specific
function (directing Internet users to a specific computer), which the
owner of the domain name exclusively can control."15 Further evi-
dence of exclusive control is the ability of registrants to buy and sell
domain names. 1 6 Finally, the court noted that the centralized system
for domain name registration allowed registrants easily to demonstrate
a claim to exclusivity. 117
109 That is, the court must have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. See
discussion supra Part II.A.
1 See generally Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1021
(9th Cir. 2002) (upholding exercise of personal jurisdiction over Costa Rican defen-
dant and affirming entry of default judgment against that defendant).
"'1 Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1029 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Network
Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int'l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 86 (Va. 2000)); Network Solu-
tions, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 858, 860 (D. Colo. 1996). See also
Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. v. Nissan Computer Corp., No. CV 99-12980 DDP (Mex),
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23996, at *29 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2001) ("[D]efendant owns
the registration of a domain name. That ownership bestows upon the defendant only
the right to have Internet users go to the defendant's web site when a user types the
domain name into a web browser. Absent a basis for claiming broader intellectual
property rights in a domain name, a domain name is an address, nothing more.").
112 Nissan Motor Corp., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23996 at *29.
1" 337 F.3d at 1024.
114 Id. at 1030 (quoting G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs., Inc. v. Kalitta Flying
Serv., Inc., 958 F.2d 896, 906 (9th Cir. 1992)).
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
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The situs of a domain name is open to some question in non-
trademark cases. Congress, in the Anticybersquatting Consumer Pro-
tection Act of 1999 (ACPA)," 18 has quite specifically defined the situs
of a domain in cases in which a trademark owner seeks to strip a bad
faith domain name registrant-a so-called "cybersquatter"--of the
name by means of an action in rem. The situs in such cases is
the judicial district in which (i) the domain name registrar,
registry, or other domain name authority that registered or
assigned the domain name is located; or (ii) documents
sufficient to establish control and authority regarding the
disposition of the registration and use of the domain name are
deposited with the court.
1 9
Courts have been aggressive in their application of the ACPA's in
rem provision. In GlobalSantaFe Corp. v. GlobalSantaFe.com,20 for
example, a federal district court ordered a domestic registry and a
Korean registrar to cancel the registration held by a Korean citizen,
despite a Korean court's ordering the registrar not to effect the cancel-
lation, and the registrant's acknowledged lack of ties to the United
States.'21 The court in this case did note, however, that "the physical
location of the '.com' registry within this district is quite significant,
for it is the location of the registry here which establishes the situs of
the power to transfer or cancel the domain name.... 1 2 2
It does not appear that any plaintiff has attempted to bring an in
rem action against a domain name for reasons other than violation of a
trademark right, nor have any cases appeared in which a plaintiff at-
tempted to extend the ACPA's in rem provision to other contexts. The
reasoning of the GlobalSantaFe court in the ACPA context, however,
might provide grounds in non-ACPA cases to find domain name situs
in the judicial district of the registry. This means that other kinds of in
rem actions against .com domain names would have to be filed in the
Eastern District of Virginia.
A further limitation on in rem actions is the possibility that the
domain name in question is registered under a foreign TLD. At least
one ICV appears to have taken note of the relatively low safeguards
for non-resident domain name registrants. Yesmoke, a Swiss ICV,
118 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2003).
11 § 1125(d)(2)(C)(i)-(ii).
120 250 F. Supp. 2d 610 (E.D. Va. 2003).
121 Id. at 613-14, 626. For a thorough review of how the DNS's structure
affects the execution of judgments against domain names, see id. at 617-24.
122 Id. at 623.
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automatically redirects anyone who visits "yesmoke.com" to "yes-
moke.ch." Recently, however, Philip Morris scored a victory that
could lead to a test of the effectiveness of domain name seizure as a
means to control ICVs: a federal district court ordered the transfer of
the domain name yesmoke.com to Philip Morris as part of the judg-
ment for Philip Morris in a trademark infringement suit.1
23
IV. TRADEMARKS
To understand why the government's use of a seized domain
could create liability for trademark infringement, it is necessary to
remember that a domain name and a trademark involve separate sets
of property rights. Registering a domain name does not establish
trademark rights) 24 Conversely, forfeiting a domain name that con-
tains a protectable term does not extinguish trademark rights in the
term. 25 Thus, if the state seeks transfer of the domain name as part of
an equitable remedy, the court might consider the ICV's trademark
interests in the domain name before ordering its transfer. Alterna-
tively, if a state obtains the right to register a domain name as part of a
judgment against an ICV, the state's subsequent use of the domain
name could infringe the ICV's trademark interests in the terms con-
tained in the domain name.
This liability may be either of two types that arise under federal
trademark law (the Lanham Act): direct infringement and dilution. It
is unlikely that either of these claims against a unit of a state govern-
ment would prevail, because it is unlikely that the government's con-
duct would meet the legal standard for infringement or dilution.
Moreover, even if a unit of state government is found to infringe or
dilute an ICV's mark, it would be liable at most for an injunction. The
123 Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Otamedia, Ltd., 331 F. Supp. 2d 228, 230-31
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). The magistrate judge in that case also recommended that Philip
Morris be awarded treble damages totaling $173 million. Philip Morris USA Inc. v.
Otamedia Ltd., No. 02 Civ. 7575, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1259, at *24 (S.D.N.Y Jan.
28, 2005) (magistrate judge's report and recommendations).
124 As discussed below, acquiring trademark rights in a domain name requires
proof that the name is "distinctive," as defined by the Lanham Act and the case law.
See infra Part IV.B.
125 The Lanham Act provides that nonuse of a trademark for three consecutive
years is prima facie evidence of trademark abandonment. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2003)
(trademark abandonment is a defense that a defendant may assert in an infringement
action, and, if proven, effectively indicates the termination of the trademark holder's
exclusive right to use the mark under the Lanham Act). See Tumblebus Inc. v. Cran-
mer, 399 F.3d 754, 764-65 (6th Cir. 2005). Ceasing to use a trademark as a domain
name clearly does not amount to nonuse, as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1127, unless
there is no other use of the mark.
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Eleventh Amendment bars suits for damages from states under the
Lanham Act. 126 Nonetheless, it is worth considering whether a state
could incur trademark infringement or dilution liability, especially
because the likelihood of prospective liability could cause the state to
obtain narrower equitable relief than it seeks.
A. Trademark Infringement
A trademark is "any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof' that is used in commerce to distinguish the
trademark holder's goods. 127 Federal trademark protection128 confers a
"limited property right" that consists primarily of the exclusive right
to use the mark in commerce. 129 The basic economic purposes of
trademark protection are to prevent competitors from free-riding on
the goodwill established by a brand, and to provide an incentive for
finns to devote resources to "the creation of new.., resources.' 30 In
order to succeed in a claim for trademark infringement, a plaintiff
must (1) hold a valid, registered trademark; (2) demonstrate that the
defendant has used the mark "in commerce" in a manner that is
"likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive;"' 3' and
(3) refute defendant's infringement-related defenses, if any are
offered. 132
126 See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527
U.S. 666 (1999) (barring suit against state for damages related to trademark infringe-
ment claim).
127 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). The Lanham Act also protects other aspects of
trade-related labeling, such as service marks, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 ("'service mark'
means any word ... used.., to identify and distinguish the services of one person")
and trade dress (the design and shape of a product or its packaging, Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 209 (2000)). For the sake of simplicity, it is
assumed that the ICV will assert an interest in a trademark. Since the other categories
of marks are protectable in the same ways as trademarks under the Lanham Act, the
legal analysis of them is identical.
128 Only federal trademark law is discussed here, but "California trademark
law claims are 'substantially congruent' with federal claims. Playboy Enters., Inc. v.
Netscape Commc'n Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1024 n. 10 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Denbi-
care U.S.A. Inc. v. Toys R Us, Inc., 84 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th Cir, 1996)).
129 New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 305-06
(9th Cir. 1992).
130 Id. at 306 n.3.
'3' 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2005).
132 See Tumblebus Inc. v. Cranmer, 399 F.3d 754, 764-76 (6th Cir. 2005)
(considering, in the context of a preliminary injunction, trademark abandonment and
first-sale defenses as possible reasons that the plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on the
merits of its trademark infringement claim).
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B. Protectable Trademarks
A trademark must be both registered and valid in order to be
protectable against infringement under the Lanham Act.1
33
Registration simply refers to the listing of a trademark in the Principal
Register 134 of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). Before
listing a mark in the Principal Register, the PTO must determine that
the mark is distinctive. 35 A mark that lacks distinctiveness must be
refused registration.
36
Registration provides evidence that the mark is valid, but its valid-
ity may be challenged in infringement litigation.137 Typically, a party
defending against infringement will attempt to show that the mark is
not valid because it is not distinctive. Courts have developed a number
of categories to guide this determination. A trademark might be "in-
herently distinctive, '' 13 meaning that "its intrinsic nature serves to
identify a particular source."' 39 "Arbitrary,' 140 "fanciful,' 14' and "sug-
gestive"' 142 marks are inherently distinctive. On the other hand, a
13 See § 1114(1) (defining infringement as a cause of action that a "regis-
trant" mal, bring).
See § 1052 (establishing Principal Register in Patent and Trademark Of-
fice).
131 See § 1052 (stating requirement for distinctiveness in the negative: "No
trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods
of others shall be refused registration on the principal register on account of its na-
ture .... ). Other bars against registrability include "immoral, deceptive, or scandal-
ous matter," and elements of government seals in the mark. See § 1052(a)-(b).
136 See § 1052(e)(1) (providing that a "merely descriptive" mark is ineligible
for registration).
' § 1057(b); § 1115(a) (providing that evidence of registration on the princi-
pal register is admissible as prima facie evidence of the mark's validity); Tie Tech,
Inc. v. Kinedyne Corp., 296 F.3d 778, 782-83 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that the pre-
sumption of validity in § 1115(a) is rebuttable).
138 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 210-11 (2000)
(citing "'Camel' cigarettes" as an "arbitrary" mark, "'Kodak' film" as "fanciful", and
"'Tide' laundry detergent" as "suggestive").
139 Id. at 210 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
140 Brookfield Commc'ns, .Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036,
1058 n.19 (9th Cir. 1999) (defining an arbitrary mark as one consisting of "wholly
made-up terms" and having no "intrinsic connection" to the product). See, e.g., Clo-
rox Chem. Co. v. Chlorit Mfg. Corp., 25 F. Supp. 702 (E.D.N.Y. 1938) ("Clorox"
bleach); Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 210 ("Camel" cigarettes).
141 Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1058 n. 19 (defining a fanciful mark as one consist-
ing of a common word or words, but having no "intrinsic connection" to the product).
See, e.g., Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149 (9th Cir.
1963) ("Black & White" scotch whiskey); Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 210 ("Kodak").
142 Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1058 n. 19 (defining a suggestive mark as one that
"conveys an impression of a good but requires the exercise of some imagination and
perception to reach a conclusion as to the product's nature"); id. (citing "Roach Mo-
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merely "descriptive" mark, which describes the "quality or features of
the product,"' 143 might be protectable if it has acquired "secondary
meaning," which means that "in the minds of the public, the primary
significance of a [mark] is to identify the source of the product rather
than the product itself."' 44 "Generic" marks, which use common
words to indicate their source, are not protectable. 45 The existence of
secondary meaning is a factual matter 46 that can be inferred from the
presence of such factors as the "amount and manner of advertising,
volume of sales, and length and manner of use.' 4 7 There are no firm,
quantitative guidelines to how much weight to accord these factors,
but one court found that more than thirty years of sales in a region,
during which the trademark holder had spent more than $400,000 on
advertising and had sold nearly one million units of its product, pro-
vided circumstantial evidence that "weighed heavily" in favor of sec-
ondary meaning. 148 Direct evidence, typically in the form of consumer
surveys, is also admissible as evidence of secondary meaning. 1
49
An ICV might be able to show that it has a protectable trademark
interest in its domain name. Establishing this interest, however, would
take considerable work. Simply registering a domain name does not
confer trademark protection upon the registrant. 50 Few ICVs appear
to have taken the additional step of registering their domain names as
trademarks with the U.S. PTO. A search for registered trademarks
including variations of "cigarette" and "cheapcig" returned a total of
three domain names, and they are all abandoned.' 51 Finally, many
tel" as an example); Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 210 (citing "Tide" laundry detergent as an
example of a suggestive mark).
141 Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1058 n.19.
'44 Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 211 (citing Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc.,
456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1982)); Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S.
159, 163 (1995) (stating that "descriptive words on a product (say, 'Trim' on nail
clippers or 'Car-Freshener' on deodorizer) can come to indicate a product's origin[,]"
and thereby acquire secondary meaning).
14" See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1058 n.19 (citing "Blinded Veterans," "Light
Beer," and "Lite Beer" as examples).
146 Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 794 (5th
Cir. 1983?.
'T Id. at 795.
148 Id.
149 See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'n Corp., 354 F.3d 1020,
1026 n.28 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Surveys are commonly introduced as probative evidence
of actual confusion.").
150 See Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. v. Nissan Computer Corp., No. CV 99-12980
DDP (Mex), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23996, at *29 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2001) ("Absent
a basis for claiming broader intellectual property rights in a domain name, a domain
name is an address, nothing more.").
'' See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, http://www.uspto.gov (follow
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ICVs' domain names contain variations on or abbreviations of "ciga-
rette"-these names are likely to be found to be descriptive, and thus
not a protectable mark in the absence of a showing of secondary
meaning.'
5 2
Still, it seems likely that an ICV could show that its use of its do-
main name satisfy the secondary meaning factors, and thus has estab-
lished "a link in the minds of consumers" between the domain name
and the product, "cheap" cigarettes.' 53 The circumstantial evidence
supporting this conclusion, of course, will be specific to each ICV.
Still, an ICV whose volume of sales in a state has attracted the atten-
tion of the attorney general is likely to have a "volume of sales" that is
significant enough to help establish the ICV as a distinct source of
cigarettes. Some ICVs have also been advertising and selling ciga-
rettes in some states for nearly a decade. 54 More specific analysis is
impossible without information about a specific ICV.
C. Infringement: Use in Commerce
Although some ICVs could probably prove that they own valid
trademarks in their domain names, it is unlikely that they will be able
to show that the state's use of the domain name is actionable under the
infringement provision of the Lanham Act. The Act requires that an
infringing use be a "use in commerce... in connection with the sale,
offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services
on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confu-
,,155sion....
Commerce is as broad as it sounds; it means "all commerce which
may lawfully be regulated by Congress.' 56 The threshold that a user
must cross in order to use a term in commerce is not high. To use the
"Trademarks: Search" hyperlink; then follow "New User Form Search (Basic)" hy-
perlink to conduct search). The domain names returned for the "cigarette" search
were supercheapcigarettes.com and cigarettes.com, and the domain name returned for
the "cheapcig" search was supercheapcigarettes.com. All of these trademarks are now
abandoned.
152 See generally GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 27-51 (providing names of
147 ICVs; representative examples include www.budgetcigarettes.com and www.
paylesscigarettes.com).
" See Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 795 (emphasizing that this link is essential for
secondary meaning).
l'4 See Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint to Add a Party for Injunctive &
Other Relief Under the Jenkins Act at 4.9, Washington v. D.C., Inc., 2002 WL
32178985 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 17, 2002) (No. CV02-2438L) (alleging that defendant
ICV advertised and sold cigarettes in Washington since 1994).
... 15 U.S.C. § ll14(l)(a) (2005).
156 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
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word "aspirin" or "Jeep" in connection with a proposed transaction is
to use the term in commerce, 5 7 though many of these uses are not
infringing because of limitations on and defenses to a trademark
holder's rights. 58 However, requiring that a term be used "in connec-
tion" with the sale of goods limits considerably the range of uses that
are actionable. Some early cases involving trademark claims against
domain name registrants did not require that a party use a domain
name to sell any goods or services. In Planned Parenthood Federa-
tion of America, Inc. v. Bucci, the court found a website's combina-
tion of referring visitors to a site that sold a product, frustrating web
users who were searching for plaintiffs website, and providing its
own "informational services" created a connection with the sale of
goods and services.1 59
Another case that represents the broad sweep that some courts
have given to the commercial use requirement of the Lanham Act is
Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky.160 In Brodsky, the defendant registered
'jewsforjesus.org" and created a corresponding website intended to
"intercept potential converts before they have a chance to see the ob-
scene garbage on the real [Jews for Jesus] site."'161 The court held that,
although the defendant sold no goods or services of his own-the site
was freely accessible-it diverted visitors from the plaintiffs site and
provided links to other sites that sold goods that opposed plaintiffs
views.1 62 This "connection" with the sale of goods and services 163 was
itself sufficient to find the defendant's use of the mark commercial.'
64
The Brodsky court went further to note, however, that defendant's
activities were "'classically competitive[,]," 65 despite the defendant's
assertions of being engaged in "non-profit political activ[ism].' 66
Although the court acknowledged this political dimension, it did not
find that this use trumped the commercial dimension, at least for
trademark purposes. 167 The defendant's use of "Jews for Jesus" "also
157 See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306
n.4 (9th Cir. 1992) (discussing these examples).
' See id. at 306-09 (discussing defenses of nominative use and fair use).
159 Planned Parenthood Fed'n Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3338, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
160 993 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1998), aff'd, 159 F.3d 1351 (3d Cir. 1998).
161 Id. at 291.
162 Id. at 309.
163 Id.
'64 Id. at 308.
165 Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood Fed'n. Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3338, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
166 Id.
167 Id.
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constitutes a commercial use of the Mark and the Name of the Plain-
tiff Organization because it is designed to harm the Plaintiff Organiza-
tion commercially by disparaging it and preventing the Plaintiff Or-
ganization from exploiting the Mark and the Name of the Plaintiff
Organization[,]" and that effect further supported a finding of com-
mercial use, in the court's view.16 8 Moreover, the defendant's use
would continue to be commercial as long as it "continue[s] to inhibit
the efforts of Internet users to locate the Plaintiff Organization Inter-
net site." 169 Brodsky thus appears to stand for the proposition that any
web-based inhibition of a trademark holder's effort to exploit its mark
is commercial. The Ninth Circuit has cited Brodsky and Planned Par-
enthood to support this view of the web.17
0
A more recent case, however, rejected the argument that diversion
from a commercial website alone is sufficient to create a connection
with goods or services. In Ford Motor Co. v. 2600 Enterprises, the
defendant created a piece of "cyber-art" by registering "fuckgeneral-
motors.com" and used the site solely to redirect visitors to Ford's
website. 17' The court found that this was not a commercial use of
Ford's trademark because the defendant created no connection to
goods or services of its own, 72 and held that the creation of "some
difficulty" for Web users looking for Ford's site was insufficient to
create the connection required for infringement.173 The 2600 court
further noted "[c]ourts additionally have extended protection to unau-
thorized uses of trademarks for the expressive purposes of comedy,
parody, allusion, and so forth, even where the medium of expression
is sold for money."'174 Finally, the 2600 court distinguished the facts in
that case from those in Planned Parenthood and Brodsky on the
grounds that the domain name that 2600 Enterprises registered "[did]
not inhibit Internet users from reaching the websites that are most
likely to be associated with the mark holder."' 175 The court thus held
that neither the domain name nor the defendant's use of "Ford" in the
168 Id. (emphasis added).
169 id.
170 See Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d
1036, 1057 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting the growing importance of "the Web as a market-
ing and advertising facility").
171 Ford Motor Co. v. 2600 Enters., 177 F. Supp. 2d 661, 662 (E.D. Mich.
2001).
172 Id. at 665.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 664.
175 Id. at 665.
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code of the web page located there was a commercial use of the Ford
mark. 1
76
A government's use of a domain name in which an ICV has a
trademark interest falls somewhere between Brodsky's inhibition-as-
commercial-use view and 2600's consideration of contextual factors
surrounding the infringement defendant's use. Overall, however, the
proposed domain name seizure program is closer to the facts in
Brodsky and Planned Parenthood, and is likely to be a "use in
commerce." The fact that is central to this assessment is that the
government's law enforcement interests would be served by seizing
the domain name that consumers associated with the ICV. If the
government does not merely create a website using a similar domain
name, but actually seizes the ICV's domain name, the government
will clearly inhibit access to the ICV's online operations. The most
extensive use would occur if the government obtained a domain name
that is identical to the ICV's trademark, which would force the ICV to
seek domain names that necessarily fall short of full exploitation of
the trademark. Indeed, such extensive interference with the ICV's
business would be a central purpose of a domain name seizure
program. This use goes beyond diverting web users' attention to
information that undermines the ICV's message and is a purposeful
disruption. 177 Although the state will presumably add an informational
component to the website that it presents under the ICV's domain
name, the likely context in which web users reach this site-namely,
when they are attempting to purchase cigarettes online-adds a
component of commercial use that the government's law enforcement
and educational purposes are unlikely to erase from this element of
trademark infringement.
D. Infringement: Likelihood of Confusion
The manner of the government's imposition in commerce through
domain name seizure, however, is likely to preclude a finding of con-
fusion arising from domain name seizure. Two theories of confusion
are generally available to plaintiffs: source confusion and initial inter-
est confusion. Source confusion arises when the use of a mark creates
confusion "as to the source, sponsorship or approval" of a good or
176 Id. at 664-65.
177 Cf Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 291 n.15 (D.N.J. 1998)
(using quotations from defendant's anti-Jews for Jesus website to illustrate that de-
fendant offered information to persuade visitors that "Jews for Jesus [is a] cult ...
founded upon deceit and distortion of fact."), aff'd, 159 F.3d 1351 (3d Cir. 1998).
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service. 178 Initial interest confusion 'arises when a defendant uses a
protected mark, or a term that is similar to that mark, to lure consum-
ers to its own site.179 Initial interest confusion is actionable even if
"the confusion is cured at some intermediate point before the deal is
completed. .. Source confusion is a practical impossibility after a
hypothetical ICV domain name seizure; the government will not re-
place the ICV's operations with its own, so there will not be goods or
services to be confused with those of the ICV. Source confusion is
therefore not considered further in this Article.1
8
'
Likelihood of confusion 82 is "'the core element of trademark in-
fringement."" 83 Courts in the Ninth Circuit use eight-factors (the
Sleekcraft factors) to determine whether a defendant's use of a mark is
likely to cause confusion.1 84 Other circuits have adopted similarly
complex balancing tests.' 85 The Ninth Circuit recently noted that
"some factors are more important than others," and that "[i]n the
Internet context, courts must be flexible in applying the factors, as
some may not apply.' 86 The confusion inquiry is factual and requires
178 Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1405
(9th Cir. 1997).
179 Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036,
1063 (9th Cir. 1999) (collecting cases in several circuits that demonstrate adherence
to this definition).
180 Television Enter. Network, Inc. v. Entm't Network, Inc., 630 F. Supp.
244, 247 (D.N.J. 1986) (quoted with approval in Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1064).
18l Cf. Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062 (holding that no source confusion could
arise from the defendant's use of the plaintiff's mark because defendant maintained
its own web site that clearly indicated that it was not operated by the plaintiff).
182 Even if source confusion were viable theory of confusion, the test for
likelihood of confusion would be the same as the one stated here. Id. at 1062 n.24
(discussing how initial interest confusion has been analyzed under Sleekcraft factors).
183 Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'n Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1024
(9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Brookfield Commc'n, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174
F.3d 1036, 1053 (9th Cir. 1999)).
184 Those factors are:
1. strength of the mark; 2. proximity of the goods; 3. similarity of the
marks; 4. evidence of actual confusion; 5. marketing channels used; 6. type
of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; 7.
defendant's intent in selecting the mark; and 8. likelihood of expansion of
the product lines.
Id. at 1026 (quoting AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir.
1979)).
185 See SunAmerica Corp. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can.., 77 F.3d 1325,
1342 (1 1th Cir. 1996) (noting that the Eleventh Circuit uses a "seven-factor test for
likelihood of confusion"); Dieter v. B & H Indus. of Sw. Fla., Inc., 880 F.2d 322, 326
(11 th Cir. 1989) (listing the seven factors used in the Eleventh Circuit, which omit
consideration of consumers' likely care in exercising care during purchases).
186 Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1026.
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a case-specific balancing of all the factors, rather than a rigid weigh-
ing or tallying of them. 87 This fact-specificity makes a confusion
claim difficult to win on summary judgment.'88
Nonetheless, courts tend to direct most of their attention to evi-
dence of actual confusion. 89 There is no general requirement for the
level of actual confusion that a plaintiff must present, but "showing of
actual confusion among significant numbers of consumers provides
strong support for the likelihood of confusion" and can be "persua-
sive."'190 Consumer survey evidence' 91 and direct evidence of confu-
sion192 are both considered probative evidence of actual confusion.
A recent case from the Ninth Circuit will help to illustrate the ac-
tual confusion factor at work. Its details are worth describing here
because of the similarities to an alternative to domain name seizure
that is discussed below. In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape
Communications Corp., Playboy alleged that Netscape's practice of
selling "keyed" advertisements in connection with its search engines
infringed Playboy's trademarks. 193 Generally speaking, this practice
involves a search engine offering advertisers the opportunity to place
a banner advertisement on a search results web page when a user
searches for certain terms. 194 In Playboy, Netscape maintained a list of
key words that included "playboy" and "playmate," and it required
adult website advertisers to key their advertisements to these terms.'
95
Playboy alleged that this practice appropriated its goodwill and
thereby infringed its trademarks.
96
187 Thane Int'l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2002)
("The list of factors is not a scorecard-whether a party 'wins' a majority of the fac-
tors is not the point. Nor should '[t]he factors.., be rigidly weighed; we do not count
beans."') (intemal citation omitted).
188 Id. at 901-02 (cautioning district courts to "grant summary judgment mo-
tions regarding the likelihood of confusion sparingly ... ").
189 See, e.g., Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1026 ("[A] a showing of actual confusion
among significant numbers of consumers provides strong support for the likelihood of
confusion.").
'90 Id. See id. at 1026 n.27, quoting Thane, 305 F.3d at 902. ("Evidence of
actual confusion constitutes persuasive proof that future confusion is likely.... If
enough people have been actually confused, then a likelihood that people are con-
fused is established.") (internal quotation and citation omitted).
191 Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1026 n.28.
192 Thane, 305 F.3d at 902 (hinting that direct evidence, such as consumer
testimony, is preferable to survey evidence).
3 Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1025.
'94 Id. at 1022-23.
'9' Id. at 1023.
196 Id. at 1025.
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The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.' 97 To sup-
port its motion, Playboy submitted an expert's report that stated that
51 percent of web users who searched for "playboy" believed that
Playboy sponsored or "was otherwise associated with" the ad that
Netscape displayed.1 98 Thirty-one percent of users believed the same
about ads appearing with "playmate" searches. 199 Playboy's expert
concluded that about one-quarter of users were confused in these
searches because of the "targeting" of the banner ads. 200 The court
stated that this report, which Netscape challenged and re-interpreted
but did not rebut with a report of its own, was "probably" sufficient to
"preclud[e] summary judgment" for Netscape.20' In another case, this
level of actual confusion was sufficient to reverse a grant of summary
judgment for a defendant, though the court's only comment on the
overall persuasiveness of the evidence was that a "reasonable jury
could conclude that a likelihood of confusion exists. 20 2
The confusion element as whole poses a considerable difficulty
for an analysis of ICV domain name seizure because there is little
information about how strong consumers' associations of brand names
with specific ICVs are. Further impeding this analysis is the fact that
the fourth Sleekcraft factor-evidence of actual confusion, which can
be "persuasive, 20 3 in an infringement analysis-can only be studied
after allegedly infringing use of the mark has begun. Also, as noted
above, 204 a court that is attempting to decide whether to order domain
name transfer as part of an injunction will probably never have evi-
dence of actual confusion before it.
Still, some of the Sleekcraft factors are less fact-intensive and lend
themselves to the prospective analysis that a court would undertake in
a domain name seizure case. Analytically, therefore, it might be most
useful to assume that some consumers will actually be confused if a
state government uses a seized domain name in the manner proposed.
This assumption will allow a tentative analysis of the other seven
Sleekcraft factors. These factors are presented in order of the certainty
with which they can be discussed in this Article:
197 Id. at 1023.
198 Id. at 1026.
'99 Id. at 1026.
200 Id. (reporting that 29 percent of users were confused in "playboy"
searches, and 22 percent were confused in "playmate" searches).
201 Id. at 1027.
202 Thane Int'l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir. 2002).
203 Id.
204 See discussion infra Part IV.D.
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1. Proximity of the goods. Since the state will not be offering any
goods for sale, this factor will weigh in the state's favor.
2. Likelihood of expansion of the product lines. For the same rea-
son as under the proximity-of the-goods factor, this factor favors the
state. Indeed, these two factors, taken together, might well remove all
but the most fleeting likelihood of initial interest confusion.
3. Marketing channels used. A threshold question is whether the
state will be considered to engage in "marketing." If so, it may be the
case the state's use of the Internet will place it within the same mar-
keting channel as the ICV. If the state also places advertisements in
print media that ICV customers use, then it will further avail itself of
similar marketing channels. Overall, this factor is likely to weigh to-
ward a likelihood of confusion.
4. Type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by
the purchaser. Even if ICV customers take little or no care to identify
an ICV when purchasing tobacco, it will be impossible for them to
mistake the state's information for an actual ICV. This factor there-
fore weighs against a likelihood of confusion.
5. Defendant's intent in selecting the mark. This factor could
weigh in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion. One of the pur-
poses of trademark protection is to prevent firms from appropriating
the goodwill that their competitors have established, and an ICV could
argue the state is doing this through its use of the ICV's mark. Even if
the court approves of the state's purpose, it will still probably recog-
nize that the state seeks to undermine the value of the ICV's mark.
This consideration might mitigate the appropriation of goodwill and
thus reduce the likelihood of confusion.
6. Similarity of the marks. It is likely that the state will be using
an identical or closely similar mark when it puts a seized domain
name to its own use, so this factor weighs in favor of finding a likeli-
hood of confusion.
7. Strength of the mark. This factor is impossible to assess with-
out knowledge of a specific mark.
E. Defense: Nominative Use
The generally available defenses against trademark infringement
are narrow. One possibly relevant defense is nominative use. "Nomi-
native use is the use of a mark to identify or to refer to the mark-
holder's product., 20 5 When a party raises the nominative use defense,
205 Wham-O, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1263
(N.D. Cal. 2003).
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a court applies a three-part test rather than the Sleekcraf! factors2°6 in
order to determine whether there has been trademark infringement.
This defense requires proof that the allegedly infringing product can-
not be identified without use of the trademark, that there is minimal
use of the mark, and that the allegedly infringing use does not suggest
the trademark holder's sponsorship or endorsement.2 °7
The state can probably satisfy the first prong of this test. Since the
trademarks that the state proposes to use are those belonging to ICVs
found liable for violating the Jenkins Act, among other laws, there are
no readily identifiable marks to use instead. The purpose of the state's
activity is to single out particular ICVs. This proposed use also sup-
ports finding in favor of the state under the third factor. The state pre-
sumably will avoid hinting at any endorsement of its message by the
ICV. The second factor, however, appears to be much more of a prob-
lem for the state. Since the state is proposing to take title to a domain
name associated with the ICV's trademarks, it will own an interest in
a domain name similar or identical to a trademark-but not the trade-
mark itself-so the state will probably engage in extensive and pro-
longed use of the ICV's marks.
A fair use defense is also available in trademark law. Since that
defense relates to one firm using another firm's mark to refer to its
own product,2 °8 the defense is not relevant here, because the state is
not offering a competing product at all.
F. Trademark Dilution
States that are considering a program of domain name seizure
should also consider potential liability for trademark dilution. Overall,
there is little risk that seizure and use of an ICV's domain name will
give rise to actionable dilution of an ICV's mark.
Trademark dilution, unlike trademark infringement, is a creature
of statute, rather than of common law, and its purpose is to protect the
uniqueness of marks, not consumers.20 9 The purpose of a right against
dilution is to allow trademark holders to stop or prevent uses of their
marks that "corrode" its value by "blurring its product identification"
or "tarnishing" the goodwill attached to it.2 '0 Thus, even if the sale of
206 Id.
207 Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2002) (outlin-
ing the elements of the nominative use test).
208 New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th
Cir. 1992).2 9 See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 429 (2003) (trac-
ing the development of trademark dilution statutes to legal academia).
210 Id. at 425.
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"Buick aspirin" or "Kodak pianos" did not confuse consumers as to
the source of these goods, legislatures recognized that such commer-
cial uses of marks could "lessen[] . . . the capacity of a famous mark
to identify and distinguish goods or services regardless of the presence
or absence of (a) competition between the parties, or (b) likelihood of
confusion, mistakes, or deception."2It Dilution can occur by two
mechanisms: tarnishment, or eroding the business reputation of the
trademark by associating the name with "an inferior or offensive
product or service; '212 and "blurring," or reducing the power of a
mark to identify a product.213 Federal law did not protect against dilu-
tion until 1995, when Congress passed the Federal Trademark Dilu-
214tion Act (FTDA). In accord with the purpose of allowing trademark
holders to stop dilution as early as possible, the FTDA provides only
injunctive relief in most cases.215
The FTDA requires a plaintiff to prove (1) that it owns a "fa-
mous" and "distinctive" mark;216 (2) that the defendant has made
"commercial use in commerce" of the mark; 217 (3) that this use began
after the mark became famous; 218 and (4) that the defendant's use
causes actual dilution of the mark.219 Requiring plaintiffs to show ac-
tual dilution results from the Court's decision in Moseley v. V Secret
Catalogue, Inc. .220 The Court recognized that this requirement is diffi-
211 H.R. REP. No. 104-374 at 3 (1995) (quoting H.R. 1295, 104th Cong. (1st
Sess. 1995)). See also 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (codifying this language).
212 Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1326 n.7 (9th Cir. 1998).
Accord Moseley, 537 U.S. at 427 (discussing a case in which a shop called "Victor's
Secret," which sold "sex toys and lewd coffee mugs," allegedly diluted the "Victo-
ria's Secret" mark).
213 Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1326 n.7; Moseley, 537 U.S. at 426.
214 Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat.
985 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)). As with trademark infringement,
only dilution claims arising under federal law are discussed here. At least twenty-five
states enacted dilution statutes prior to the passage of the FTDA. Moseley, 537 U.S. at
430.
2. 15 U.S.C.S, § 1125(c)(1) (LexisNexis 2005) ("The owner of a famous
mark shall be entitled.... to an injunction against another person's commercial use in
commerce of a mark or trade name .. "). But see § 1125(c)(2) (providing for recov-
ery of lost profits and destruction of infringing articles in cases where a plaintiff
proves a defendant's "willful[] inten[t] to trade on the owner's reputation or to cause
dilution of the famous mark").
216 § 1125(c)(1) (noting that the "owner of a famous mark shall be entitled" to
relief "after the mark has become famous").
217 § 1125(c)(1).
218 § 1125(c)(1); Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1324.
219 § 1 125(c)(1); Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433.
220 See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 426-28 (discussing conflict among federal courts
of appeal over question of whether the FTDA requires proof of actual dilution).
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cult to satisfy,22' and Justice Kennedy pointed out in a concurring
opinion the tension between the actual dilution requirement and the
"essential role of injunctive relief . . . to 'prevent future wrong, al-
though no right has yet been violated. ,, 222 Finally, the Court left open
to question the kinds of evidence that will prove actual dilution: the
Court conceded that direct evidence in the form of consumer surveys
may be unreliable, but circumstantial evidence of actual dilution may
suffice in cases where the allegedly diluting junior mark is identical to
the senior mark.223
1. Element One: ICVs' Marks' Distinctiveness and Fame
Distinctiveness has the same meaning in trademark dilution cases
as it does in infringement cases.224 Trademark distinctiveness was
described above. The FTDA provides eight nonexclusive factors to
guide courts' determinations of fame,225 but one court has stated that
fame carries its ordinary meaning.226 Examples of marks whose fame
221 See id. at 433-34 (conceding that "evidence of an actual 'lessening of the
capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services' ... may be
difficult to obtain," but responding that § 1125(c) "unambiguously requires a showing
of actual dilution, rather than a likelihood of dilution").
222 Id. at 436 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Swift & Co. v. United States,
276 U.S. 311, 326 (1928)).
221 Id. at 434 (majority opinion). In trademark law, the terms "junior mark"
and "senior mark" capture the notions of priority of use. A "senior mark" is one that
has been used before a competing "junior mark." See, e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. PF
Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 215 (2d Cir. 1999) (applying these terms in the context of
the FTDA).
214 See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 215-17 (discussing traditional distinctiveness
doctrine). For a full discussion of distinctiveness, see supra pp. 301-02.
215 15 U.S.C.S. § 1125(c)(1)(A)-(H) (LexisNexis 2005) provides that courts
may consider, but are not limited to, the following factors:
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods
or services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is
used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels
of trade used by the marks' owner and the person against whom the injunc-
tion is sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third par-
ties; and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the
Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
226 Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 215. The dictionary definition of "fame" is "renown,"
and "famous" is the state of being "well known" or "celebrated." THE OXFORD
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parties to litigation have not contested are Pepperidge Farm's Gold-
fish crackers,227 Panavision, and Panaflex
Once again, it is difficult to predict whether an ICV will own a
famous and distinctive mark. The analysis in Part IV.B tentatively
predicted that most ICV trademarks are descriptive, though some may
be suggestive (and thus inherently distinctive). 229 Fame is equally
difficult to discuss in the abstract, though it seems clear that no ICV
brand has achieved widespread recognition similar to Goldfish
crackers. Still, several of the factors suggested by the FTDA could
weigh in favor of finding an ICV's trademarks famous. First, the Web
creates a nationwide channel for commerce.23 ° Second, some ICVs
have advertised nationwide for nearly a decade. 23' Third, the Web
enables ICVs to do business nationwide.232 But aside from the
advertising of some ICVs, these factors do not distinguish an ICV site
from any other commercial website, and do little to lend fame to the
ICV's trademark. The other factors provided by the FTDA are either
neutral or militate against finding most ICVs' marks to be famous.233
Overall, the nationwide reach of advertising and sales that the Web
facilitates makes it unlikely that ICVs hold famous and distinctive
trademarks.
REFERENCE DICTIONARY 292 (Joyce M. Hawkins ed., 1986).
227 Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 215.
228 Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1319, 1324 (9th Cir.
1998). The Panavision and Panaflex marks are associated with motion picture camera
equipment. Id.
229 See also 15 U.S.C.S. § 1125(c)(1)(A) (LexisNexis 2005) (directing courts
to consider "the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark" when
assessing the fame of a mark).
230 § 1125(c)(1)(E). See also Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414,
418 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 301
(S.D.N.Y. 1996), "[clreating a [web]site, like placing a product into the stream of
commerce, may be felt nationwide---or even worldwide....").
231 § 1125(c)(1)(C) (suggesting consideration of "the duration and extent of
advertising and publicity of the mark"); Wash., Dep't of Revenue v. www.dirtcheap
cig.com, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1051-53 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (noting magazine
and other forms of advertising); Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint to Add a Party
for Injunctive and Other Relief at § 4.6, Wash. Dep't of Revenue v. D.C., Inc., 260 F.
Supp. 2d 1048 (W.D. Wash. 2002) (No. CV-2438L).
131 See § 1125(c)(1)(D) (suggesting consideration of "the geographical extent
of the trading area in which the mark is used); www.dirtcheap.com, 260 F. Supp. 2d at
1051-53 (finding that a Missouri-based ICV distributed cigarettes to Washington state
citizens).
233 The least favorable factor to an ICV is probably § 1125(c)(1)(H), which
counts registration on the Principal Register in favor of fame.
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2. Element Two: The State's "Commercial Use in Commerce" of the
ICV Mark
This somewhat redundant language 234 accomplishes two things.
Taking the second half of the phrase first, "in commerce" adverts to
the jurisdictional predicate of the FTDA, Congress's power to regulate
interstate commerce. 235 As discussed above, a state's use of an ICV's
domain name is likely to be found a use in commerce. "Commercial
use" somewhat narrows the reach of anti-dilution rights. According to
the Ninth Circuit, this phrase limits anti-dilution protection to relief
against defendants who use marks in "commercial speech, as opposed
to political or other more closely protected speech. .. The extent
to which the government's speech is protected in the context of regu-
lating ICVs is discussed in the next Part. At this point, however, it
suffices to note that the government will not use the ICV's mark in
advertising or in connection with the sale of any goods or services.
237
The government will not, therefore, use the trademark in a way that
"capitalizes" on the associations that surround the mark.238 Still, it is
possible that a court would view the government as seeking to become
a "cybersquatter" occupying the ICV's trademark-related domain
name, where the thwarting of the ICV's commercial activity is itself a
commercial use.239 Since the government would lack the purpose of
prising money from the ICV, however, and is instead seizing the do-
main for effecting revenue regulations, a court may hesitate to extend
this rationale to domain name seizure. In summary, the ICV probably
will not be able to show that the government's use is commercial.
234 See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir. 2002)
(deeming the statutory language "ungainly").
See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (defining "commerce" as "all commerce
which may lawfully be regulated by Congress"). Accord Playboy Enters., Inc. v.
Netscape Commc'n Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1024 n.l 1 (9th Cir. 2004).
236 Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1032.
237 Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 875, 880 (9th Cir. 1999)
("Appellants do not use trademarks qua trademarks as required by the caselaw to
establish commercial use. Rather, Appellants use words that happen to be trademarks
for their non-trademark value.").
238 See id. at 880 ("Commercial use under the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act requires the defendant to be using the trademark as a trademark, capitalizing on
its trademark status.").
239 See, e.g., id. (reviewing cases in which cybersquatters-parties that regis-
ter domain names in order to sell them to others whose trademark rights are impli-
cated in the domain names-were found to be commercial uses).
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3. Element Three: Fame Must Precede Diluting Use
The two means of domain name seizure could produce different
results under this element. If a state seeks an order for the transfer of a
domain name, and the ICV raises the possibility of dilution, there is
no way to avoid the fact that the acquisition of fame will have pre-
ceded the government's use of the mark. On the other hand, if the
government obtains a domain name that contains protectable terms as
an asset to secure a judgment for unpaid tax, it is possible that the
court will not consider the anti-dilution rights of the ICV. In this case,
an ICV might later bring a claim under the FTDA, but the ICV would
have to prove that its mark was famous before the state's diluting use
of it began. This may prove more difficult for the ICV than raising the
issue of dilution at the time a remedy is originally crafted for the
state's Jenkins Act claims.
4. Element Four: Actual Dilution
As discussed above, the FTDA's requirement of a showing of ac-
tual dilution is recent, and there is a dearth of case law showing what
satisfies this requirement. 240 The most helpful statement of what kind
evidence that proves actual dilution comes from Moseley itself, in
which the Court stated that actual dilution might "reliably be proven
through circumstantial evidence ... [when] the junior and senior
marks are identical. 241 One court has read Moseley to require that the
junior use must "plainly constitute dilution., 242 In Wham-O, Inc. v.
Paramount Pictures Corp., the court rejected blurring and tarnishment
theories of dilution resulting from the "supposedly comedic misuse"
of a toy in a motion picture.243 The court appeared to undertake this
analysis after viewing the footage in question, and without benefit of
expert witnesses and consumer surveys. 244 As to the blurring theory,
the Wham-O court found that the defendant's use of the toy in a movie
and related video game did nothing to make the plaintiffs mark "less
240 See, e.g., Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n v. JSL Corp., 90 F. App'x 484, 486 (9th
Cir. 2003) (vacating an injunction granted under the FTDA and remanding for con-
sideration in light of the actual dilution requirement); Horphag Research Ltd. v.
Pellegrini, 337 F.3d 1036, 1039 (9th Cir. 2003) (vacating lower court's dilution find-
ing, and remanding for reconsideration in regard to recent Supreme Court decision).
241 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 434 (2003) (discussing
proof of dilution through circumstantial evidence).
242 Wham-O, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1261
(N.D. Cal. 2003).
243 Id. at 1261-62.
244 See id. at 1261-62, 1265 (denying plaintiff's motion for a temporary re-
straining order).
20061
unique or identifiable., 245 As to the plaintiff's tarnishment theory, the
court held that the defendant's portrayal of an "obvious and unmistak-
able misuse" of the plaintiffs product posed little risk of creating the
impression, "even [in] the youngest or most credulous film viewer,"
that the plaintiffs product was unsafe. 46
Wham-O thus indicates that the more blatant the "misuse" of a
trademark is, the less likely it is that the misuse will "'whittl[e] [a]way
... a trademark's value.... 2 47 If a state seizes and ICV's trademark-
protected domain name, the state probably will not attempt to lead
web users to believe that the site offers inexpensive cigarettes. Indeed,
the state will probably make its own views on online cigarette sales as
clear as possible. The touchstone of tamishment-associating a mark
with an inferior product-is therefore missing. The clarity of the
state's message is also likely to defeat an ICV's blurring theory. The
state will not be conducting its own cigarette sales, making remote the
possibility that the state will be seen as attempting to identify its own
services with those of the ICV.248 Finally, the state's strong distinction
of its information from an ICV's services should be a forceful argu-
ment against actual dilution at the time the domain name is trans-
ferred, as well as after the government actually begins to use the do-
main name.
In summary, an ICV will probably be unlikely to convince a court
that a state's seizure and subsequent use of a domain name dilutes any
underlying trademark interest of the ICV. Since it appears likely that
the domain name transfer-a kind of outer boundary to the state's
ability to interfere with an ICV's use of its mark-will not infringe
any of an ICV's trademark rights, the state might also wish to con-
sider tactics that stop short of outright domain name seizure. These
tactics are known as "Google bombing" and "keyed" advertising. The
appeal of using these methods is that they would allow the state's own
information to appear when consumers are searching for ICVs. In this
way the state might be able to divert consumers' attention from ICVs.
"Google bombing" means "[s]etting up a large number of Web
pages with links that point to a specific Web site so that the site will
appear near the top of a Google search when users enter the link
text. ' 249 This practice has been used by activists to criticize political
245 Id. at 1262.
246 Id. at 1261.
241 Id. at 1260 (quoting Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences v. Creative
House Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446, 1457 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted)).
248 See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1326 n.7 (9th Cir.
1998) (defining dilution by blurring).
249 Word Spy, Google Bombing, http://www.wordspy.com/words/Google
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and cultural figures. 250 The state, perhaps in conjunction with other
states or non-profit groups, might be able to achieve a similar effect
by linking to ICVs' websites.
The state might also consider purchasing "keyed" advertisements
from search engines.2"' The purpose of this tactic would be to display
advertisements for and links to the state's own websites when con-
sumers conduct searches for such phrases as "cheap cigarettes" or
"cheap tobacco." If the state restricted itself to purchasing advertise-
ments keyed to generic terms like "cigarettes" and "tobacco," it would
face almost no risk of infringing any ICVs' trademarks. Although
there is some risk that this kind of searching infringes trademarks, as
the discussion of Playboy showed, the search engine itself is more
likely to suffer this liability. As the analysis above predicts, the state's
failure to offer goods or services commercially is likely to shield it
from infringement or dilution liability.
V. THE FIRST AMENDMENT
An ICV could raise two claims under the Free Speech Clause of
the First Amendment in order to oppose government seizure of the
ICV's domain name.252 First, the ICV could argue that the govern-
ment's seizure of the ICV's domain name is an impermissible, con-
tent-based restraint on the ICV's speech. Second, the ICV could argue
bombing.asp (last visited Feb. 16, 2006) (defining "Google bombing" and providing
examples of the practice).
250 See Saul Hansell, Foes of Bush Enlist Google to Make Point, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 8, 2003, at C8 (describing how activists waged a campaign that resulted in
Google's top search result for "miserable failure" pointing to President George W.
Bush's official online biography).
251 For details about this practice, see supra notes 163-67 and accompanying
text. See also Grant Gross, Trademark Lawsuit Filed against Google Keywords,
INFOWORLD, Jan. 30, 2004, http://www.infoworld.com/article/04/01/30/HNgoogle
suit_ .html (reporting lawsuit filed by American Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc.
against Google to enjoin it from selling keyed advertising that uses the phrase
"American Blind").
252 "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech ......
U.S. CONST. amend. I. As has been the case throughout this Article, only federal law
is considered here. The California Constitution also contains a free speech clause that
states "[e]very person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or
abridge liberty of speech or press." CAL. CONST., art. I, § 2, cl. a .The California free
speech clause offers similar, if not broader, protection for speech. See PruneYard
Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 78-83 (1980) (noting that the California Con-
stitution provides a right of a non-owner to speak on private property, while the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution does not).
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that the government's use of a seized domain name constitutes com-
pelled speech, and is therefore unconstitutional.
A. Domain Name Seizure as a Content-Neutral Regulation of Speech
A plausible theory for viewing state seizure of an ICV's domain
name pursuant to a lawsuit for failure to comply with the Jenkins Act
(and, potentially, state law) is as follows: Although the state's com-
plaint and proposed remedy do not refer to the content of the ICV's
speech (that is, they are content-neutral), domain name seizure pre-
vents the ICV from delivering its message253 at the online location at
which it has developed its business. Furthermore, the ICV might ar-
gue, the government's actual purpose is more insidious than prevent-
ing the use of a particular domain name; the government actually
seeks to prevent the ICV from offering consumers the option of buy-
ing cigarettes online, subject to the caveat that the laws in their home
state might require them to pay tax on the sale. The state, in other
words, is going well beyond expressing its own viewpoint on the mat-
ter of the Jenkins Act and related law, and is instead attempting to
control the information that consumers use in connection with the
legal activity of purchasing tobacco. Under this view, the state-and
the court that issues an order or injunction to help its cause-is not
only regulating the content of the ICV's speech, but is also paternalis-
tically restricting the ICV's viewpoint.
This argument has some merit and might strike some resonance
with a court, but the state will most likely be able to convince the
court that its regulatory program-bringing lawsuits against ICVs
under the Jenkins Act-is an economic regulation whose effects on
the ICV's speech are incidental. An intriguing alternative, worth men-
tioning but not further explored here, is that the ICV's First Amend-
ment right is protected by a "liability rule," and might be subject to
condemnation by the state.254
1. Overview of the Content Distinction in First Amendment Doctrine
It is worth emphasizing at the outset that the only potential means
for regulating speech in play in this part of the analysis is by the
253 This message could be viewed as a combination of commercial and politi-
cal speech. See infra Part V.A. 1.
254 For a full development of this possibility, see generally Thomas W.
Merrill, The Constitution and the Cathedral: Prohibiting, Purchasing, and Possibly
Condemning Tobacco Advertising, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 1143 (1999) (exploring the
possibility that the ICV's First Amendment right is protected by a "liability rule," and
might be subject to condemnation by the state).
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state's succeeding in obtaining a court order directing the transfer of
an ICV's domain name. The message that the government might pre-
sent by using that domain name will be considered in Part V.B.
Thus, the first question is whether a domain name is capable of
containing protectable speech. The U.S. Supreme Court has developed
two categorical approaches for determining whether an expression or
action is "speech. 255 One categorical distinction is between speech
and conduct.256 The government, in general, may regulate conduct
without implicating the First Amendment.257 Since many regulations
affect speech in some way, however, the speech-conduct distinction
has been incorporated into a broader inquiry: content neutrality.258
The leading case 259 in the articulation of content neutrality is United
States v. O'Brien,2 60 and Ward v. Rock Against Racism gave this
statement of the "O'Brien test:"
[T]he government may impose reasonable restrictions on the
time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the re-
strictions [1] are justified without reference to the content of
the regulated speech, [2] that they are narrowly tailored to
serve a significant governmental interest, and [3] that they
leave open ample alternative channels for communication of
the information.26'
Thus, the speech-conduct distinction survives in the first prong of the
O'Brien test.
Although it is impossible to generalize, a regulation that satisfies
this prong of O'Brien stands a fair chance of surviving constitutional
255 See Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 1249, 1250 (1995) ("A court can uphold government regulations on the ground
that they need not be evaluated according to First Amendment standards, or it can
uphold the same regulations on the quite different ground that, having applied First
Amendment standards, the regulations are valid and withstand constitutional scru-
tiny.").
256 See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,409 (1974).
257 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (stating that "[w]e
cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled
'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an
idea.").
258 See DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 41 (2d ed. 2003) ("[Tlhe
crucial question is no longer, 'Does the defendant's conduct constitute speech?', but
rather, 'Is the government's regulation based on content?"').
259 Id. at 25.
260 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 367.
261 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (internal quota-
tion and citation omitted) (enumeration added) (explaining the role of content neutral-
ity in the government's regulation of public forums).
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262
review. Moreover, even if a regulation is found to be content-
specific, it might survive review. This might happen if the regulation
targets a category of content that the Court has allowed to be regulated
on the basis of content. These categories include incitement to vio-
lence and illegal advocacy, defamation, misleading advertising, "true
threats," fighting words, and obscenity.263
A content-specific regulation might also be constitutional if it is
"narrowly tailored" to serve a "compelling state interest. ',264 This gen-
eral exception to the content neutrality rule requires that the regulation
must "restrict as little speech as possible to serve the goal," and the
government's interest must be in addressing a "pressing public neces-
sity" or preserving an "essential value. 265
In addition, some categories of protected speech receive "less"
protection than others and are subject to special rules. The "commer-
cial speech" category is of particular interest to the regulation of
ICVs. "Commercial speech" means "expression related solely to the
economic interests of the speaker and its audience., 266 The leading
statement of the test for a valid commercial speech regulation is found
262 See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 299 n.8
(1984) ("Reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions are valid even though they
directly limit oral or written expression.").
263 See generally Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (differentiating
between simple advocacy, which is protected under the First Amendment, and illegal
advocacy, which the Court considers incitement to imminent lawless action); N.Y.
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (requiring statements made by newspaper
to have "actual malice," or reckless disregard for truthfulness, for an individual public
official to recover civil damages); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (stating the government may ban commercial
communication as misleading advertising if the information is more likely to deceive,
rather than inform, the public); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (defining
"true threats" as encompassing "those statements where the speaker means to com-
municate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a
particular individual or group of individuals."); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (explaining "fighting words" to "by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d
1197, 1202 (7th Cir. 1978) (stating that the government "may proscribe content on
basis of imminent danger of grave substantive evil" in narrow circumstances); Miller
v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (concerning obscenity in regard to the mailing of
sexually explicit material).
264 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 680 (1994) ((O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321
(1988))).
265 Id.
266 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 561 (1980). See also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484,
495-96 (1996) (illustrating long-standing understanding of commercial speech as
advertisements for goods and services).
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in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commis-
sion of New York:
For commercial speech to come within [the First Amend-
ment], it at least must concern lawful activity and not be mis-
leading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental in-
terest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers,
we must determine whether the regulation directly advances
the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
267
A more recent case, however, urged caution in applying Central
Hudson. In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,2 68 a plurality of the
Court argued that "bans against truthful, nonmisleading commercial
speech rarely seek to protect consumers from either deception or over-
reaching," and tend to rest upon irrational assumptions about con-
sumer behavior.269 The Court went on to strike down270 a state law
that prohibited the advertising of alcohol prices anywhere other than
inside a licensed liquor store,271 although there was not a majority
rationale.272 Nonetheless, 44 Liquormart is worth noting because of
the uncertainty it created in the future vitality of Central Hudson.2 73
Finally, permanent injunctions are evaluated according to the
same criteria of content neutrality and content specificity.2 74 Thus, a
regulation is permissible if it passes the O'Brien test, while content-
based injunctions must serve a compelling government interest.275
267 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 (providing a test for valid commercial
speech regulation).
268 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (holding Rhode Island's restriction on advertising
liquor prices unconstitutional).
269 Id. at 503.
270 Id. at 507-08.
271 Id. at 489-90 n.2.
272 See id. at 508-14 (criticizing prior cases that defer to legislature's judg-
ments as to "vice" advertising).
273 The Court appeared ready to address some of these concerns in the Octo-
ber 2002 term, but it dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted in the relevant
case. See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 655 (2003) (per curiam) (dismissing
certiorari).
274 See Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunc-
tions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DuKE L.J. 147, 169-75 (1998).
275 See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 450 (2d
Cir. 2001) (discussing the scope of protection for speech).
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2. Application of the Content-Neutrality Rule to ICV Domain Name
Seizure
The Internet has posed some novel challenges for the application
of existing First Amendment doctrine. While federal courts have taken
note of the Internet's potential to advance the values underlying free
speech,276 they have tended to rely upon analogies to specific aspects
of free speech, rather than creating a new, Internet-specific doctrine of
free speech.277 Early cases have established the general proposition
that activities on the Internet are not exceptional; protection against
government regulation of speech on the Internet is neither absolute
nor non-existent.
a) First Prong of O'Brien: Domain Name Seizures' Reference to the
Content of Speech
Recall that the relevant regulation for the purposes of analysis un-
der the O'Brien rule is the transfer of a domain name to a state gov-
ernment. The threshold issue for First Amendment purposes, then, is
whether domain names are capable of expressing speech. One court
has squarely faced this issue. In Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solu-
tions, Inc.,278 the Second Circuit applied the test for content neutral-
ity279 to a government-sanctioned policy that limited the creation of
generic top-level domains (gTLDs). 280 The effect of this regulation
was to deny most parties from gaining access to the DNS root servers,
and thus to prevent them from introducing their own gTLDs. 281 First,
the court noted that, although the gTLDs ".com," ".org," and ".net"
once signified the kind of organization that had registered the domain
name, that meaning had been lost.282 As a result, "little if any mean-
i76 See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 868-69 (1997)
(pointing out lack of regulation in the "vast democratic forums of the Internet").
2 7 See, e.g., United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 205-07
(2003) (declining to apply public forum analysis to Internet terminals in public librar-
ies); Reno, 521 U.S. at 868 (noting that the constraints that justify regulations of other
media-scarcity and a "history of extensive Government regulation"-are absent
from the Internet).
27' 202 F.3d 573 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing whether domain names are capa-
ble of expressing speech in a first amendment context).
9 Id. at 587-88.
280 Id. at 579 (stating that the U.S. Department of Commerce entered into a
domain name management agreement with the defendant, the then-exclusive domain
name registry). See supra Part III for an explanation of top-level domains and the
domain name system (DNS) in general.
281 Name.Space, 202 F.3d at 579-80.
282 Id. at 587 n.15.
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ingful expressive content may be attributed to the current gTLDs." 283
Lacking expressive content, "existing gTLDs do not constitute pro-
tected speech under the First Amendment., 284 But the court took care
to limit this holding, and left open the possibility that "certain domain
names and new gTLDs, could indeed amount to protected speech.
The time may come when new gTLDs could be used for 'an expres-
sive purpose such as commentary, parody, news reporting or criti-
cism'.. ,, 285
In addition, the Name.Space court held that the gTLD regulation
was facially neutral, and thus could survive under the O'Brien test
even if gTLDs contained "speech [that is] given the widest possible
protection under the Constitution., 286 The allegedly infirm regulation
simply controlled the time, manner, and place of gTLD creation.287
The court also noted that a party is "free to express itself' through
second- and higher-level domain names.288
Expression through higher-level domain names was evident in
Ford Motor Co. v. 2600 Enterprises, where the court recognized the
use of a domain name as an element of "cyber-art" and, at least im-
plicitly, recognized the domain name's ability to convey meaningful
289 ohrwrexpression. In other words, the domain name was the message.
An ICV is thus likely to be able to demonstrate that its domain
name contains protectable speech, but it is unlikely to persuade a court
that being ordered to transfer the domain name to a state is a content-
based regulation. A casual survey of ICV domain names reveals that
most of them are terse descriptions of the ICV's wares and presumed
appeal-low prices. 290 Although most of these names contain, at most,
a snippet of commerce-related expression, they are probably sufficient
to qualify as commercial speech.29' It would not be difficult, however,
283 Id. at 586.
284 Id.
285 Id. Courts have recognized that a broader range of computer-related ex-
pression deserves at least some First Amendment protection. See Universal City Stu-
dios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 326-27 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff'd sub nom.,
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 451 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that
computer source code may contain protected "speech elements"); id. at 339 (holding
that hyperlinks on a web page may contain "expressive and functional elements").
286 Name.Space, 202 F.3d at 587. As discussed infra, the court found that the
regulation easily satisfied the other two prongs of O 'Brien.
287 Name.Space, 202 F.3d at 587.
288 Id. at 588.
289 See Ford Motor Co. v. 2600 Enters., 177 F. Supp. 2d 661, 662-64 (E.D.
Mich. 2001).
290 See GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 27-51 (listing names of ICVs).
291 See generally 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996)
(holding that sale prices for alcohol are commercial speech).
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for an ICV to select a domain name that contains a political message;
"www.screwthejenkinsact.com," for example, is a sentiment that fits
with the message of at least one ICV.
2 9 2
Finding protected speech in a domain name, however, will not
render seizure unconstitutional, because the seizure is likely to be
content-neutral. The major focus of the state's case will be on the
ICV's role in avoiding reporting and paying tax on cigarette sales. If
the state obtains the ICV's domain name, the seizure will be the result
of the ICV's liability for violating the Jenkins Act and state laws; the
domain name is, in effect, a piece of property that the state might seek
to satisfy a judgment. The state could probably argue, therefore, that
seizing a domain name is no more of a content-specific speech restric-
tion than is seizing a bank account or an automobile. In addition, it
might be able to counter an objection that domain name seizure re-
stricts the ICV's ability to use the domain name for political speech by
pointing to non-speech criteria, such as the jurisdictional criteria dis-
cussed above, for choosing ICV targets.
Some examples of domain name seizures in criminal cases lend
some general support to the permissibility of seizures in the context of
civil Jenkins Act enforcement. In one case, the U.S. Department of
Justice seized the domain name of a copyright "pirate" as part of a
plea agreement. 93 For a period of time after the plea agreement, the
government used the seized website to provide information about the
case as well as a "general anti-piracy message. ' ' 294 The U.S. Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) has also seized at least four websites
used in connection with criminal violations of drug paraphernalia
laws.295 These sites now bear the plain message: "By application of
292 See Dirtcheapcig.com: The Last Refuge of the Persecuted Smoker,
http://www.dirtcheapcigs.com/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2004) (billing its site as "the last
refuge of the persecuted smoker").
293 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Seizes Top
Internet Site Involved in Copyright Piracy (Feb. 26, 2003), http://www.cyber
crime.gov/rocciPlea.htm (announcing the seizure of http://www.isonews.com/); US
Seizes Bootleg Games Site, BBC NEWS, Feb. 27, 2003, http://newsbbc.co.uk/1l/hi/
technology/2803927.stm (reporting Rocci's seizure and quoting David Sobel of the
Electronic Privacy Information Center: "This could be equivalent to the death penalty
in the context of free speech on the internet").
294 Copyright Piracy and Links to Crime and Terrorism: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of John G. Malcolm, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General for the Criminal Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/malcolmTestimony.htm.
295 The sites are: http://www.pipesforyou.com/, http://www.colorchanging
glass.com/, http://www.420now.com/, and http://www.omnilounge.com/ (last visited
Jan. 12, 2004). See also Declan McCullagh, U.S. Crime-Fighters Seize Web Sites,
[Vol. 16:279
STOPPING INTERNET-BASED TOBACCO SALES
the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, the website you
are attempting to visit has been restrained by the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania pursuant to Title 21,
United States Code, Section 853(e)(1)(A). '296
b) O 'Brien Element Two: Narrow Tailoring to Serve a Significant
Government Interest
This element of the O'Brien test is fairly lenient with respect to
government litigants. First, the state is highly likely to be able to
demonstrate that its interests in domain name seizure are "significant."
These interests, presumably, will include collective state tax and pre-
venting the state's underage citizens-whose demand for most goods
is also highly price-sensitive-from purchasing tobacco online. The
Supreme Court has deemed "substantial" such interests as "maintain-
ing [a city's] parks... in an attractive and intact condition....297 and
"protecting ... citizens from unwelcome noise., 298 The state's interest
in regulating ICVs should fit easily into these police power-related
functions. Indeed, the Court has stated that the "State's interest
in preventing underage tobacco use is substantial, and even compel-
ling. ... ,,299
The outcome on the narrow-tailoring part of this element is
somewhat more difficult to predict. On one hand, this requirement
does not mean that a regulation is invalid "simply because there is
some imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome on
speech.,300 On the other hand, a regulatory scheme that achieves nar-
row tailoring by a complex set of exemptions and special conditions
stands a chance of being invalidated for being irrational.30 1 The
CNET NEWS.coM, Feb. 26, 2003, http://news.com.com/2100-1023-986225.html.
296 See www.pipesforyou.com/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2002). The statute re-
ferred to, 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(l)(A) (2001), is part of a larger federal statutory scheme
designed to punish a person engaged in a drug-related "continuing criminal enter-
prise." The statute authorizes forfeiture of property as soon as an information or in-
dictment is filed. § 853(e)(l)(A).
297 Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 296 (1984).
298 Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 806
(1984) (holding that protecting citizens from unwelcome noise is a substantial
interest).
299 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 564 (2001) (invalidating a
wide variety of restrictions on tobacco advertising).
300 United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985) (discussing how
regulations are not invalid merely because they are not the only option).
301 Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173,
190 (1999) ("The operation of [the Government's statute and]... attendant regulatory
regime is so pierced by exemptions and inconsistencies that the Government cannot
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chances for the state's success under this prong thus depend upon the
context in which the court views domain name seizure. If seizure is
viewed as part of an aggressive program designed to increase compli-
ance with the Jenkins Act and to reduce underage citizens' access to
cheap tobacco, then it seems likely to be viewed as an instrumental
feature of that program, a small component of an economic and public
health program that restricts the speech conveyed in a domain name.
But it is also possible that domain name seizure will be seen as an
incongruously broad measure against the background of current ef-
forts to compel ICVs to comply with the Jenkins Act. Attempting to
seize ICV domain names without first seeking an injunction that or-
ders an ICV to file Jenkins Act reports, for example, might appear to
fail to meet this requirement.0 2 Overall, the state will probably suc-
ceed in convincing a court that domain name seizure is a "narrowly
tailored" means of advancing a substantial government interest.
c) O'Brien Element Three: Leaving Open Ample Alternative
Channels for Communication
Domain name seizure is likely to satisfy this final requirement of
the O'Brien test. The state's success under this element of the content
neutrality test might depend upon the nature of any other accompany-
ing relief, if any. The presence of other broad relief, such as an injunc-
tion enjoining the ICV from resuming business using any domain
name that contains the second-level domain name of the seized do-
main name, would completely shut down the channel of communica-
tion using that second-level domain. A metaphor of "cyberspace as
place" might convince the court that a "place" represented by the sec-
ond-level domain has been closed to the ICV.303 Here, it bears repeat-
ing that such an order would follow from a finding of the ICV's legal
liability, and would be informed by concerns unrelated to speech.
Even at this restrictive end of the spectrum-that is, a prohibition on
the ICV doing business with a series of domain names-the ICV
hope to exonerate it."); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 489 (1995) (in-
validatin0 labeling regulations pertaining to the alcohol content of beer).
Cf Judgment & Order, at 1, Washington v. www.dirtcheapcig.com, Inc,
No. CV02-2438L (W.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 2003) (granting on stipulation of counsel,
state's request for injunction ordering defendant ICV to file past and future reports to
comply with Jenkins Act).
303 See generally Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the
Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REv. 439 (2003) (exploring the role of this meta-
phor in Internet-related legal decisions); and Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 798 (1989) (discussing this O'Brien prong in connection with "time, manner,
and place" regulations).
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would still be able to present its views concerning the Jenkins Act on
the Internet and elsewhere.
Overall, the greatest challenge to the state will be in convincing a
court that domain name seizure is a content-neutral regulation. The
state stands a good chance of being able to do so, and will also proba-
bly be able to prevail under the remaining two prongs of the O'Brien
test.
3. Domain Name Seizure as a Content-Based Regulation of Speech
Despite the likelihood that domain name seizure will be viewed as
a content-neutral regulation, it is possible that a court would find do-
main name seizure to be a content-based speech restriction.
a) Domain Name Seizure under the Compelling Government Interest
Test
If a court does find content regulation, the state might be able to
convince the court that the seizure should survive as a content-based
regulation of speech. That is, domain name seizure both serves a
compelling government interest and is narrowly tailored for this pur-
pose.304 As to the compelling state interest, the Court in Lorillard To-
bacco Co. v. Reilly stated that "preventing underage tobacco use is
substantial, and even compelling... ,305 Although this was not a hold-
ing, it would be quite favorable to a state. Still, it is unclear whether
the state's interest in Jenkins Act and state tobacco tax compliance is
"compelling." Without a firmly established state interest, it is difficult
to determine whether domain name seizure is narrowly tailored to
advance that interest. The state could argue that the amount of expres-
sive content in a domain name is extremely small. Domain names,
after all, must be short enough for most people to remember easily. As
a result, the state might be able to convince a court that the speech
restriction is "de minimis" and therefore does not implicate the ICV's
First Amendment rights.3°
304 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 680 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating the test for a permissible content-
based s~eech restriction).
05 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 564 (2001) (emphasis
added).
306 See Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 587 (2d
Cir. 2000) (citing Connecticut State Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ. Members,
538 F.2d 471, 481 (2d Cir. 1976)).
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b) Domain Name Seizure as a Commercial Speech Regulation
Alternatively, the state could probably prove that domain name
seizure is a permissible commercial speech regulation. As described
above, most ICV domain names contain only commercial speech, if
they contain speech at all. A legal ruling that the ICV skirted tobacco
tax laws, or at least led state residents to do so, would support at find-
ing that the ICV's domain name-www.zerotaxcigarettes.com, for
example-concerned unlawful activity and was misleading to con-
sumers.30 7 Thus, the state could probably argue that any speech in the
ICV's domain name, and perhaps some of the text of the ICV's site,
does not qualify for commercial speech protection because it is mis-
leading or is concerned with unlawful activities. Moreover, as dis-
cussed above, the state's interest in enforcing its laws and collecting
tax revenue is "substantial," if not compelling.30 8
The state is likely to meet trouble under the third prong of Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New
York. Domain name seizure, the state would have to argue, "directly
advances" its interest in collecting taxes on tobacco taxes. 30 9 By di-
vesting an ICV of its domain name, the state would both remove the
ICV's commercial operation from a familiar location and replace it
with the state's own message. 310 But the ICV could argue that, absent
an injunction ordering it to change its practices with respect to to-
bacco taxes, it will be able to obtain a similar domain name and con-
tinue its business. The ICV might further argue that consumers who
are frustrated by the disruption of one ICV website will turn to one of
the hundreds of others. Thus, the overall advancement of the state's
interest by domain name transfer alone might be minimal and attenu-
ated, rather than direct. The ICV's position could be persuasive, be-
cause the court will probably require more than an assertion that the
measure will be effective.31' In 44 Liquormart, for example, the Court
307 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 563-64 (1980).
308 Id. at 564, 566 (requiring substantial government interest).
309 Id. (requiring direct advancement of government interest).
310 Any question that this remedy would violate the Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments is set aside for this First Amendment analysis.
311 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 505 (1996), evalu-
ating whether a ban is effective in furthering a State's interest, the Court notes:
[A] commercial speech regulation 'may not be sustained if it provides only
ineffective or remote support for the government's purpose.' For that rea-
son, the State bears the burden of showing not merely that its regulation will
advance its interest, but also that it will do so 'to a material degree.'
Id. (citations omitted).
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held that a state defending a total ban on liquor price advertising failed
this part of the Central Hudson test.312 The state offered little more
than a "common sense" argument that the ban would reduce competi-
tion, which in turn would keep prices above a competitive level,
which in turn would reduce alcohol consumption.313 Although statisti-
cal evidence demonstrating the effect upon underage smokers of price
and the Internet as a tobacco distribution channel might be especially
convincing in this case, this kind of evidence is not required. Anec-
dotes and case studies can be sufficient to prove material advancement
of the state's interest. 314 44 Liquormart thus instructs that, if a state
pursuing domain name seizure finds itself justifying the seizure as a
permissible commercial speech regulation, the state should be able to
present evidence that the seizure will advance the goal of enforcing
tax collection "to a material degree. 315
Finally, the state could find itself in an untenable position with re-
spect to the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test. This element
requires the state to prove that its regulation is no more extensive than
necessary to serve its goal.3 16 As argued above, the state might be
unable to convince a court that domain name seizure alone is effec-
tive. If the state attempts to expand the breadth of injunctive relief that
it seeks, it runs the risk of losing on the third element of Central Hud-
son; it is possible that additional proposed features of the remedy will
lack evidence to support their effectiveness.
In summary, the state can probably convince a court that domain
name seizure is a permissibly commercial speech regulation, but in
order to do so, the state will need specific evidence of the effective-
ness of domain name seizure in materially advancing its interest in tax
enforcement and preventing underage smoking.
B. Domain Name Seizure as Compelled Speech
Finally, an ICV could object to a domain name seizure on the
grounds that the government's subsequent use of the domain name
will violate the ICV's right against compelled speech. This objection
is unlikely to persuade a court to block (or to refrain from assisting in)
domain name transfer. The right against compelled speech has two
facets, both of which are examined below.
312 See id. at 505-07.
313 Id. at 504-07.
314 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001).
315 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 505.
316 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 567 (1980).
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1. Direct Compulsion to Speak
The Supreme Court has recognized a right against compelled
speech in contexts where the government required citizens affirma-
tively to speak.317 That is, this aspect of the right protects persons
against being compelled to "repeat an objectionable message out of
their own mouths... ,,318 The other requirement is some form of co-
ercion, usually in the form of a fine or the threat of arrest and impris-
onment. In the leading case, West Virginia State Board of Education
v. Barnette, the Court held that public schoolchildren could not be
compelled to salute the flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance.
319
Part of the West Virginia law that was invalidated provided for expul-
sion for those who refused to join the pledge, which in turn exposed
the parents to potential arrest or fines for having a "delinquent"
child. 320 The Court found that such an affirmance, whether verbal or
symbolic, "requires affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind"
321
in order to "coerce uniformity of sentiment.,
322
The other leading case in the development of the right against di-
rect compulsion to speak is Wooley v. Maynard.323 In that case, the
Court affirmed an injunction preventing the enforcement of part of a
state vehicle code, which made it a misdemeanor to "'obscure the
figures or letters on any number plate."'' 324 The Wooley Court added a
property-based conception of this right to the underlying right of the
person: "New Hampshire's statute in effect requires that appellees use
their private property as a 'mobile billboard' for the State's ideologi-
cal message.... ,,325
317 See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
(holding that expulsion of public school students for refusal to salute the flag and
recite the Pledge of Allegiance violated the First Amendment).
318 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Bonta, 272 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1094 (E.D.
Cal. 2003), aff'dsub nom., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Shewry, 384 F.3d 1126 (9th
Cir. 2004).319 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 624.
320 Id. at 629 n.5.
321 Id. at 633.
322 Id. at 640-42 (noting further that "[i]f there is any fixed star in our consti-
tutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics").
323 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
324 Id. at 707 (quoting N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 262:27-c (Supp. 1975)). The
plaintiff in Wooley objected to being compelled to display the state motto, "Live Free
or Die." Id. at 715. See also PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 85-88
(1980) (emphasizing that Wooley's central feature is protection against the compelled
use of private property to carry a message created by the government).
325 Id.
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Although an ICV could make a facially plausible case that the
state's use of a domain name forces an ICV to carry the state's mes-
sage on its property, this objection is not likely to prevail. Moreover,
the element of using criminal sanctions to coerce a person to speak is
entirely missing from this hypothetical. The state would impose its
message after the ICV had been found liable for violating federal tax
law (and potentially wide variety of state laws as well); the govern-
ment's message is imposed after a finding of liability for some non-
speech-related offense.
The notion that the ICV is nevertheless being forced to carry the
government's message should prove equally unpersuasive. As ex-
plained at length in the discussion of trademarks and domain name
seizure, it is well settled that domain name registration is a discrete
property right. This property right may be very narrow in scope, in-
volving no more than the right to exclude others from registering the
same name, but it is a property right nonetheless. 326 Thus, under the
general principles of property seizure, the state will take title to the
domain name upon seizure. In this sense, installing a government
message at a seized domain name cannot be said to employ the prop-
erty of the ICV to carry the message.
The possibility that an ICV may possess overlapping trademark
rights in terms contained in the domain name probably will not
change this outcome. Thus, the argument might run, the government's
use of a seized domain name still implicates the ICV's property rights
in its trademark. There do not appear to be any cases directly address-
ing whether the government's use of a trademark constitutes com-
pelled speech.327 The strongest argument against this expected view of
the ICV, however, is the boundaries of the property right in trade-
marks stop well short of permitting a trademark holder to exclude
others from making a trademark part of a political message, even if
that message is directed against the trademark holder.328 The trade-
326 Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying three-
part test to conclude that a domain name registrant has a property right in the registra-
tion). But see Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. v. Nissan Computer Corp., No. CV 99-12980
DDP (Mex), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23996, at *29 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2001) ("Absent
a basis for claiming broader intellectual property rights in a domain name, a domain
name is an address, nothing more.").
327 The closest case might be PGMedia, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 51 F.
Supp. 2d 389, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff'd sub nom., Name.Space, Inc. v. Network
Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573 (2d Cir. 2000), in which the court discussed the plain-
tiff's argument that being forced to use one of a few generic top-level domains consti-
tuted compelled speech. The court dismissed this argument, which is admittedly not
directly analogous to the instant hypothetical.
328 See 15 U.S.C.S. § 1125(c)(4)(C) (LexisNexis 2005) (exempting "news
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mark holder's rights against infringement and dilution were discussed
at length above, and probably are not implicated by the government's
proposed action. The argument that the government's use of the mark,
whether through a domain name or otherwise, is likely to be attributed
to the ICV will therefore probably fail.
2. Right against Unwanted Association with a Speaker
An ICV could raise the argument that domain name seizure
violates the other dimension of the right against compelled speech.
This aspect of the right bars the government from compelling
individuals or groups to fund speech that they find objectionable.
Most of the cases finding violations of this right have involved
mandatory membership in groups that use membership revenues to
engage in political activity.329 In general, two conditions are necessary
to trigger this right. The first is that the party asserting this right be a
member "by law or necessity" of the group engaged in the offending
speech.33° Speech attributable to the government does not meet this
requirement; the government may express its own views without
implicating the right against compelled speech, so long as it does not
"drown out" other speakers.33' The Supreme Court recently affirmed
that government speech is entitled to First Amendment protection.332
So long as the government dictates the "overarching message," has
the ability to participate in crafting a specific message, and "exercises
final approval authority" over that message, the government can likely
remain clear of impermissibly compelling others to speak, even if it
funds the speech by taxing particular groups.333 If, however, the
government's endorsement of the speech is not clear, courts look to
commentary" from dilution liability).
329 See generally United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001)
(invalidating program to fund generic mushroom advertising); Glickman v. Wileman
Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997) (upholding program that used fees to fund
advertising "germane" to overall purposes); Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1
(1990) (invalidating state bar's practice of using membership dues to engage in politi-
cal activities); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 242 (1977) (holding that
members of a teachers' union were entitled to "appropriate relief' to prevent their
union dues from being used for purposes other than collective bargaining); Int'l Ass'n
of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961) (invalidating use of unsegregated labor
union dues to fund union's political activities).
330 United Foods, 533 U.S. at 413.
331 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Bonta, 272 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1107
(E.D. Cal. 2003) (quoting NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1566 (11 th Cir. 1990)).
332 See Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass'n, 125 S Ct. 2055, 2065 (2005).
333 Id. at 2063.
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the statutory scheme of which the speech is a part.334 If the speech is
"germane" to a broader regulatory scheme that involves the compelled
association, the speech is permissible. 335 If, on the other hand, the
speech is the very purpose of the compelled association, the program
is impermissible.
336
The state's proposed use of a seized ICV domain is highly likely
to be viewed as government speech, so there is little chance that this
speech will infringe the ICV's right against compelled speech. The
protection given to government speech might even allow a state to
fund domain name seizures with revenues derived from tobacco
taxes.337 The government will probably seek to unequivocally identify
itself as the source of speech on the seized website, so it will avoid the
close questions of government endorsement of speech that are present
in many compelled speech cases. To ensure that this defense applies,
however, the government should avoid any hint that its activity is
funded by taxes levied against tobacco companies. This will mark the
domain name seizure program as one funded out of the public fisc, for
which the government is politically accountable, rather than one that
is funded by taxing the very target of the campaign.338 If this caution
is observed, it is highly unlikely that the state's program will consti-
tute even this indirect form of compelled speech.
CONCLUSION
A state's attorney general occupies a uniquely powerful role in
stopping online tobacco sales. They are well-positioned to gather in-
formation about the volume of Internet-based tobacco sales in their
states. Their interests in stopping these sales are also considerable.
Most importantly, the combination of low prices and the easy avoid-
ance of age verification create a serious public health risk. These sales
also deprive states of considerable amounts of revenue. But states
have the legal means available to sue ICVs and thereby stop large-
... See United Foods, 533 U.S. at 412-15.
... Glickman, 521 U.S. at 473.
336 See United Foods, 533 U.S. at 415-16 (contrasting impermissible regula-
tory scheme that was unattached to a "purpose related to an association independent
from the speech itself..." with the permissible scheme in Glickman).
3 See Livestock Marketing, 125 S Ct. at 2062 (quoting Bd. of Regents v.
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000), "'The government, as a general rule, may
support valid programs and policies by taxes or other exactions binding on protesting
parties."').
338 Cf R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Bonta, 272 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1100-10
(E.D. Cal. 2003) (discussing objections to anti-tobacco advertising funded by tax on
tobacco).
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scale distributors from participating in the market for tobacco. More-
over, the states will be able to obtain far-reaching relief, including the
possibility of conveying their own message to consumers who are
seeking tobacco online. States bear most of the costs for underage and
other forms of illegal tobacco use, but they also have the most flexible
means of pursuing anti-smoking strategies. States should seriously
consider suing ICVs.
